Key Points - The article discusses the recent economic developments, including the Bank of Japan's interest rate hike and weaker-than-expected U.S. non-farm payroll and CPI data [2][64][76] - The Japanese government has approved a significant economic stimulus plan amounting to 18.3 trillion yen (approximately 118 billion USD), marking a 31% increase from the previous year's budget [64] - The U.S. unemployment rate rose to 4.6% in November, with non-farm payrolls adding 64,000 jobs, which was above market expectations [74] - The U.S. CPI for November was reported at 2.7% year-on-year, significantly below market expectations, influenced by data quality issues due to the government shutdown [76] Asset Classes & Overseas Events & Data Asset Classes - The Japanese yen depreciated rapidly, while COMEX silver saw a significant increase [2] - Major stock indices in developed markets showed mixed performance, with the S&P 500 up 0.1% and the Nasdaq up 0.5% [3] - The WTI crude oil price decreased by 1.6% to 56.5 USD per barrel, while COMEX gold increased by 1.2% to 4,354.0 USD per ounce [2][45] Economic Data - The U.S. unemployment rate increased to 4.6%, with non-farm payrolls adding 64,000 jobs in November, surpassing expectations [74] - The CPI for November was reported at 2.7%, significantly lower than expected, with core CPI at 2.6% [76] - The Bank of Japan raised interest rates by 25 basis points, while the European Central Bank maintained its rates [2][64] Commodity Prices - Most commodity prices saw increases, with WTI crude oil down 1.6% and COMEX silver up 9.4% [45][52] - The prices of various metals, including LME copper and aluminum, also increased [52]

Core Viewpoint - The recent appreciation of the RMB is not primarily driven by "settlement" but rather influenced by a weaker USD and central bank interventions, with settlement rates showing a decline rather than an increase [2][3][4]. Group 1: RMB Appreciation and Settlement - Since mid-October, the RMB has appreciated significantly by 1.42% against the USD, while the USD index only weakened by 0.34%. This has sparked discussions about a potential "year-end settlement wave" [3][4]. - Despite the RMB's appreciation, the settlement rate has decreased from 63.1% in September to 54.1% in October and 52.0% in November, indicating that the expected settlement wave has not materialized [3][4][8]. - Various indicators suggest that a settlement wave typically leads to higher swap points, increased RMB transaction volumes, and reduced foreign exchange deposits. However, since November, swap point spreads have decreased from 97 pips to 36 pips, and foreign exchange deposits have continued to grow [3][4][19]. Group 2: Year-End Settlement Patterns - Historically, "year-end settlement" tends to occur in December due to increased current account income, but improvements in settlement rates are not significant. The growth in settlement amounts is attributed to concentrated export receipts in Q4, significant increases in primary and secondary income, and slight increases in settlement rates [4][19]. - The changes in year-end settlement rates are influenced by prior RMB performance and the timing of the Spring Festival. When the RMB strengthens, the selling rate typically declines, while improvements in settlement rates often lag by 1-2 quarters [4][55]. Group 3: Potential for RMB to Break "7" - A delayed settlement wave may provide some short-term support for the RMB, with historical data indicating that after two consecutive quarters of appreciation, settlement rates tend to improve. The upcoming Spring Festival may also extend this improvement into January [4][77]. - However, risks associated with a potential USD rebound and central bank interventions may affect the pace at which the RMB breaks the "7" level. Current non-commercial short positions in the USD have reached a record high, indicating a risk of reversal [4][88].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the concept of "deposit migration" and highlights three common misconceptions in the market regarding excess savings and their implications for investment behavior [2][3][4]. Group 1: Misunderstandings about Excess Savings - Misunderstanding 1: The market may underestimate excess savings; "deposit migration" involves more than just deposits. The total excess savings, when considering various funds, approaches 10 trillion yuan, contrary to the less than 4 trillion yuan estimated based solely on deposits [2]. - Misunderstanding 2: The speed of market entry may be underestimated; non-bank deposits are not an accurate measure of "migration." The "non-bank net liabilities" metric, which excludes disturbances from interbank business, shows two rounds of high growth since September 24, indicating a more pronounced "deposit migration" in the second half of this year [3]. - Misunderstanding 3: The investment sensitivity of excess savings is potentially underestimated. Since 2021, residents have overly allocated excess savings to fixed-income assets, which have seen declining excess returns, making it difficult to meet reinvestment intentions amid accelerating housing price declines. The process of "rebalancing" funds may continue as nominal GDP gradually recovers by 2026 [4].

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes that the technological revolution is irreversible, supported by China's vast market, which allows for multiple rounds of trial and error, forming a complete industrial and supply chain that external fluctuations cannot shake. This perspective was shared by Zhao Wei, Chief Economist at Shenwan Hongyuan Securities, during the Southern Finance Forum 2025 [4]. Economic Outlook - Zhao Wei predicts that the economic trend in 2026 will enter a "non-typical recovery" phase characterized by "stable volume and rising prices," where prices shift from a downward spiral to a moderate recovery, leading to improved corporate profits and micro-level confidence [4]. - Structural differentiation will continue, with significant disparities in policy support across different economic sectors, resulting in an unbalanced recovery [4]. A-share Market Insights - Regarding the current discussions on the revaluation of A-shares, Zhao Wei suggests focusing on "capital rebalancing" rather than "value revaluation." He notes that after 2022, the market was overly pessimistic about fundamentals, with the overall A-share dividend yield exceeding the national bond yield by 100 basis points, indicating a severe mispricing of the market [5]. - Four major events have reversed market expectations: changes in the policy environment post-September 2024, the emergence of DeepSeek shifting investment thinking from macro to micro, concerns over U.S. policy stability due to "reciprocal tariffs," and discussions on "anti-involution" leading to a shift of fixed-income funds towards equity assets [6]. Technological Revolution and Investment Opportunities - Zhao Wei maintains an optimistic view on the AI bubble, asserting that the fourth technological revolution will not end due to short-term market fluctuations. He highlights China's unique advantage of a large consumer market that allows for extensive trial and error, ultimately leading to a robust industrial and supply chain [6]. - As the process of "capital rebalancing" deepens in 2026, opportunities in the A-share market are expected to emerge continuously, encouraging investors to seize investment opportunities arising from the non-typical recovery and the new technological revolution [7].

Core Viewpoint - The focus of future fiscal revenue and expenditure may be on maintaining deficits, standardizing tax incentives, supplementing local financial resources, and resolving hidden debts [2][48]. Group 1: Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Overview - In the first eleven months of 2025, the national general public budget revenue reached 200,516 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 0.8%, while expenditure was 248,538 billion yuan, up 1.4% year-on-year [6][47]. - The divergence in fiscal revenue and expenditure in November showed improved expenditure but pressured income, with broad fiscal expenditure down 1.7% year-on-year, a significant narrowing of the decline by 17.5 percentage points compared to October [2][7]. - Broad fiscal revenue fell by 5.2% year-on-year in November, further declining by 4.6 percentage points from October [2][50]. Group 2: Factors Influencing Fiscal Performance - The divergence in fiscal revenue is partly due to base disturbances and the ongoing drag of land finance, with November 2024 broad fiscal revenue showing a recovery of 11% year-on-year, creating high base pressure [8][48]. - The income growth rate weakened, further constraining overall financial expansion space, while the low performance of land finance persisted [2][8]. Group 3: Support for Fiscal Expenditure - The 5,000 billion yuan limit on local special bonds and the implementation of financial tools became significant supports for broad fiscal expenditure in November, with government fund expenditure turning positive [10][49]. - Despite the ongoing drag from land finance and short-term pressure on income, the fiscal expenditure growth rate is expected to continue recovering due to the support from the local debt limit [10][49]. Group 4: Future Fiscal Strategy - Looking ahead to 2026, the focus of fiscal revenue may emphasize maintaining necessary fiscal deficits and standardizing tax incentives and fiscal subsidy policies [13][48]. - The expenditure side will prioritize addressing local fiscal difficulties and urging local governments to actively manage debts, targeting both the stock of hidden debts and the flow issues of local financial resources [13][48].

Overview - The U.S. unemployment rate rose to 4.6% in November, exceeding market expectations, while non-farm payrolls showed a slight increase of 64,000 jobs, against a forecast of 50,000 [1][6] - The labor participation rate increased to 62.5%, slightly above the expected 62.4% [6] Structure - The rise in the unemployment rate to 4.6% reflects temporary layoffs and improvements in labor supply, with the government’s "deferred resignation" plan contributing to job losses in October [2][20] - The unemployment rate is close to the critical point of 4.7% that would trigger the "Sam Rule," but the credibility of the data is questioned due to a low response rate of 64% in household surveys [2][27] Outlook - The probability of the Federal Reserve lowering interest rates in January 2026 is uncertain and will depend on December's economic data [3][35] - Short-term demand remains weak due to tariff impacts, government shutdowns, and AI effects, but labor supply may contract further, leading to a gradual rebalancing of the job market by 2026 [3][32]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes that the market has misunderstood the concept of "deposit migration," highlighting three main misconceptions regarding excess savings, the speed of market entry, and the investment attributes of excess savings [2][9]. Group 1: Misunderstanding Excess Savings - There is a common misconception that resident deposits equal total savings, and a decline in deposits does not necessarily mean savings are entering the market. The discussion often focuses on time deposits, overlooking the structural impact of the conversion between deposits and wealth management products [3][10]. - The scale of excess savings is greater than excess deposits, with a significant amount of wealth management funds potentially being allocated to the stock market. Current estimates suggest that excess savings could exceed 9.4 trillion yuan, with a savings rate reaching a 15-year high of 29.8% [3][26]. - Historical experiences indicate that the potential scale of savings entering the stock market could be in the trillions. For instance, in previous bull markets, significant amounts of savings were allocated to the stock market despite lower excess savings levels [4][31]. Group 2: Underestimating Market Entry Speed - The use of "non-bank deposits" to track the scale of "migration" may lead to underestimating the speed at which residents are entering the market. Non-bank deposits, which total around 35 trillion yuan, include interbank business disturbances that do not accurately reflect resident market entry [5][34]. - The "non-bank net liabilities" indicator provides a better tracking mechanism for resident market entry, showing significant increases since September 2024, which may indicate two rounds of "deposit migration" [5][37]. - Auxiliary indicators such as margin deposits and financing balances also suggest that there has been a notable "deposit migration" phenomenon since mid-2024, with significant increases in both metrics [6][41][45]. Group 3: Underestimating Investment Attributes - Unlike overseas experiences, excess savings in China since 2021 have shown a stronger investment attribute, primarily driven by changes in asset allocation behavior rather than direct consumption support [7][49]. - The reduction in housing expenditures has significantly contributed to excess savings, with a notable decline in annual housing consumption from 7.7 trillion yuan in 2021 to 3.1 trillion yuan by 2025 [7][53]. - The current over-allocation of assets to fixed-income products, which have seen declining excess returns, may lead residents to seek new investment opportunities, especially as housing prices face downward pressure [7][63].

Group 1: Industrial Production Trends - Industrial production continues to show weakness, with construction activity remaining relatively stable [2] - The average daily transaction area of commercial housing in 30 major cities decreased by 13.8% week-on-week and is down 33.4% year-on-year [29] - The operating rate of blast furnaces has continued to decline [4] Group 2: Steel and Cement Industry Insights - Weekly apparent consumption of five major steel products has decreased [5] - The operating rate of the cement industry remains stable at 38.5%, with a slight year-on-year increase of 4.8% [15] - Cement shipment rates fell by 0.8% week-on-week, while the inventory ratio continues to decline [19][20] Group 3: Petrochemical and Consumer Goods - The operating rate of the soda ash sector increased by 3.6% week-on-week, while PTA's operating rate remained stable [8][11] - The operating rate of polyester filament has decreased by 1.3% week-on-week [12] - The automotive semi-steel tire operating rate showed weakness, increasing by only 0.7% week-on-week [8] Group 4: Demand and Consumption Patterns - Real estate transactions remain low, with first, second, and third-tier cities all experiencing weak performance [29] - Freight volumes have decreased, but port cargo throughput remains higher than the same period last year [34] - Movie attendance and box office revenue are significantly higher than in previous years, while automobile sales have declined [42][46] Group 5: Price Trends - Agricultural product prices have generally increased, with vegetables and eggs rising by 2.1% and 0.7% respectively [55] - Industrial product prices have seen a notable decline, with the energy and chemical price index dropping by 2.6% [60] - The overall industrial price index decreased by 1.8% week-on-week [60]

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article is that since mid-2025, the U.S. economy has exhibited characteristics of "jobless growth" and a "K-shaped recovery," raising questions about whether the economy can transition out of this K-shaped feature in 2026, either through jobless growth dragging down overall growth or high growth leading to full employment [2][5][89] Group 2 - The U.S. economy has been experiencing structural imbalances characterized by "jobless growth" and a "K-shaped economy" since early 2025, with non-farm payrolls declining to an average of 18,000 per month from June to August 2025, significantly below historical non-recession averages [2][6][89] - The K-shaped economy is marked by disparities in consumption, employment, wages, and wealth, where high-income households see significantly higher consumption growth compared to low-income households, and the wealth gap continues to widen [2][23][89] Group 3 - The causes of the K-shaped economy include economic slowdown, monetary easing, the impact of Trump's policies, and a structurally bullish stock market, with "jobless growth" being a primary factor contributing to the K-shaped economy [3][50][89] - The labor market has become more relaxed, with low-wage groups being the first to feel the economic downturn and the last to benefit from recovery, indicating that the U.S. economy has entered a late cycle [3][62][89] Group 4 - The article discusses the difficulty in bridging the K-shaped gap, suggesting that the U.S. economy may not significantly improve in 2026, with a potential shift from "jobless growth" to "low employment growth," but the K-shaped characteristics may persist due to a weak labor market balance [4][90][89] - Historically, the K-shaped recovery phenomenon has been observed after previous recessions, where unemployment rates remained high during recovery phases, indicating a pattern that may repeat in the current economic context [4][90][89] Group 5 - The article highlights that the K-shaped characteristics of the U.S. economy are not merely cyclical but trend-based, with significant structural forces at play since the 1980s, leading to increasing income and wealth inequality [4][77][89] - The wealth distribution has become increasingly concentrated, with the top 20% of households holding 71% of net assets and 87% of corporate equity and mutual fund assets, while the bottom 20% hold only about 3% [35][89]

文 | 赵伟、陈达飞、赵宇、王茂宇、李欣越 联系人 | 陈达飞 摘要 二、大类资产&海外事件&数据：美联储FOMC会议偏鸽，关注下周经济数据 多数发达国家国债利率上行，贵金属价格大涨 。当周，标普500下跌0.6%，纳指下跌1.6%；10Y美债收益 率上行5.0bp至4.19%；美元指数下跌0.6%至98.40，离岸人民币升至7.0535；WTI原油下跌4.4%至57.4美 元/桶，COMEX黄金上涨2.5%至4302.7美元/盎司。 欧元区2026年财政基调为总体中性 。12月11日，欧元区发布2026年欧元区财政预算声明。声明指出， 2026年将保持总体中性立场。预计2025年欧元区赤字率3.2%，2026年为3.3%。政府债务率预计从2025 年 的88.8%小幅上升至2026年的89.8%。 12月美联储FOMC会议偏鸽，关注下周公布的美国11月就业、CPI数据 。12月FOMC例会：降息25BP， 重启"扩表"，首月购买短期美债400亿美元，降息投票出现三张反对票；10月美国JOLT职位空缺767万 人，高于市场预期；重点关注下周公布的美国就业、CPI数据。 风险提示 地缘政治冲突升级；美国经济放缓 ...