2026 年 02 月 26 日 开源晨会 0226 ——晨会纪要 数据来源：聚源 -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 2025-02 2025-06 2025-10 沪深300 创业板指 昨日涨跌幅前五行业 昨日涨跌幅后五行业 | 行业名称 | 涨跌幅(%) | | --- | --- | | 传媒 | -1.155 | | 银行 | -0.456 | | 汽车 | 0.056 | | 家用电器 | 0.130 | | 石油石化 | 0.190 | | 数据来源：聚源 | | | 行业名称 | 涨跌幅(%) | | --- | --- | | 钢铁 | 4.694 | | 有色金属 | 3.478 | | 建筑材料 | 2.749 | | 房地产 | 2.533 | | 基础化工 | 2.162 | | 数据来源：聚源 | | 开 源 证 券 证 券 研 究 报 wumengdi@kysec.cn 证书编号：S0790521070001 观点精粹 总量视角 【固定收益】上清所托管量环比减少，债市整体杠杆率持平——2026 年 1 月债市 托管数据点评-20260225 事件：1 月末，上清所债 ...

Core Viewpoint - The upcoming Japanese House of Representatives election on February 8 will significantly impact Japan's political landscape and debt risk, with a continued focus on expansionary fiscal policy but a more cautious approach to avoid a "Truss moment" [2][8]. Group 1: Election Dynamics - The election features three main factions: the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party, the Center-Left Reform Alliance, and other opposition parties [2][3]. - The LDP, led by Prime Minister Kishi, is predicted to maintain a majority, with a 99% probability of Kishi continuing as Prime Minister and an 81% chance of the LDP securing over 250 seats [2][3][13]. - Three potential outcomes exist: a significant LDP win reducing the need for fiscal stimulus, a marginal increase in LDP seats leading to moderate debt risk, or a decline in LDP seats raising policy uncertainty and fiscal cliff risks [3][19][20]. Group 2: Post-Election Macro Policy - Post-election, Japan's macro policy will remain expansionary, but if the LDP gains a larger advantage, the pace of policy implementation may be more cautious [4][24]. - A key commitment is to lower the food tax rate, with a proposal to suspend it for two years, although this may be moderated post-election to alleviate market concerns [4][26]. - The LDP plans to enhance critical mineral reserve systems and establish a Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to scrutinize foreign investments [4][32]. Group 3: Debt Risk Assessment - Japan's sovereign debt risk is relatively low, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 230% by 2025 and interest payments constituting 1.49% of GDP in 2024 [5][37]. - A potential suspension of the food tax could create a 5 trillion yen deficit annually, impacting new bond issuance [5][37]. - Japan's status as a net creditor, with a net international investment position of 84% of GDP, and a low foreign ownership of government bonds (14%) contribute to its lower debt risk perception [5][43][44].

Core Viewpoint - The upcoming Japanese House of Representatives election on February 8 will significantly impact Japan's political landscape and debt risk, with a cautious approach expected to avoid a "Truss moment" [2][8]. Group 1: Election Dynamics - The election features three main factions: the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party, the Center-Left Reform Alliance, and other opposition parties [2][3]. - The LDP, led by Prime Minister Kishi, is projected to maintain a strong position, with a 99% probability of Kishi continuing as Prime Minister and an 81% chance of the LDP securing over 250 seats [2][3][13]. - Three potential outcomes are anticipated: 1. LDP gains a larger majority, reducing the need for excessive fiscal stimulus and minimizing debt shock risks [3]. 2. LDP sees a slight increase in seats, leading to moderate debt risk due to necessary cooperation with opposition parties [3]. 3. LDP loses seats, increasing policy uncertainty and fiscal cliff risks [3][20]. Group 2: Post-Election Macro Policy - Post-election, Japan's macro policy will remain focused on fiscal expansion, but with a more cautious approach to stabilize debt risks and avoid market volatility [4][24]. - A key commitment is the reduction of the food tax, with a proposal to suspend it for two years, although this may be moderated post-election to alleviate market concerns [4][26]. - The government plans to enhance critical mineral reserve systems and establish a Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to scrutinize foreign investments [4][32]. Group 3: Debt Risk Assessment - Japan's sovereign debt risk is relatively low, with a projected debt-to-GDP ratio of 230% by 2025, and interest payments constituting 1.49% of GDP in 2024 [5][37]. - The potential suspension of the food tax could create a 5 trillion yen deficit, representing 17% of new bond issuance [5][37]. - Japan's status as a net creditor, with a net international investment position of 84% of GDP, and a low foreign ownership of government bonds (14%) contribute to its lower debt risk perception [5][43].

Group 1: Election Context - The Japanese House of Representatives election on February 8, 2026, will significantly impact the political landscape and debt risk in Japan[1] - The ruling coalition, consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party, holds 233 seats, while the opposition consists of the Center-Left Reform Alliance with 172 seats[3] - Current polls indicate a 99% probability that Prime Minister Kishi will remain in office, with an 81% chance that the LDP will secure over 250 seats[3] Group 2: Fiscal Policy Outlook - Post-election, Japan's macroeconomic policy will continue to favor expansionary fiscal measures, but with a more cautious approach to avoid a "Truss moment" scenario[2] - The LDP's proposed tax cuts, particularly a two-year suspension of the food tax, could create a fiscal gap of ¥5 trillion, representing 17% of new bond issuance[5] - Japan's fiscal deficit is projected to reach ¥40 trillion in 2025, with total government debt expected to be 230% of GDP[5] Group 3: Debt Risk Assessment - Japan's sovereign debt risk is relatively low, with a net international investment position of 84% of GDP, indicating a strong asset position[5] - The structure of Japanese debt ownership shows that only 14% is held by foreign investors, with the Bank of Japan holding 46%[5] - The potential for external spillover risks from Japan's debt situation will depend on the election outcome and subsequent government policies[5]

Election Context - The Japanese House of Representatives election on February 8, 2026, will significantly impact the political landscape and debt risk in Japan[1] - The ruling coalition, consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party, holds 233 seats, while the opposition coalition has 172 seats[2] - Current polls show Prime Minister Kishi's approval rating at 66%, with the LDP's support at 36%[2] Election Outcomes - Three potential scenarios exist for the election results: 1. LDP gains a solid majority (over 261 seats), reducing the need for aggressive fiscal stimulus[2] 2. LDP sees a marginal increase in seats, maintaining a need for cooperation with opposition parties, leading to moderate fiscal policies[2] 3. LDP loses seats, increasing political uncertainty and fiscal cliff risks[2] Fiscal Policy Post-Election - Post-election, Japan's macroeconomic policy will remain focused on expansionary fiscal measures, but with a more cautious approach to avoid a "Truss moment"[3] - Key commitments include a two-year suspension of food tax, which could create a fiscal gap of approximately 5 trillion yen annually, representing 17% of new bond issuance[4] Debt Risk Assessment - Japan's government debt is projected to reach 230% of GDP by 2025, with interest payments constituting 1.49% of GDP in 2024[4] - The fiscal deficit for 2025 is estimated at 40 trillion yen, with total revenues of 93 trillion yen and expenditures of 134 trillion yen[4] - Japan's net international investment position is strong, at 84% of GDP, indicating lower sovereign debt risk despite high debt levels[4] Market Implications - The election outcome will influence the external spillover risks associated with Japanese debt, particularly in terms of yen asset volatility and global liquidity[4] - The Bank of Japan's response to potential fiscal-driven yield increases will be crucial in managing market stability[4]

Group 1: Global Fiscal Policy Insights - In 2025, global fiscal policy is expected to shift towards a "cross-cycle" approach, with supply-side investments becoming a key focus, particularly in defense and industrial support [9][10] - The fiscal stance of major economies (US, EU, Japan) is anticipated to expand significantly, with Japan's deficit rate projected to increase by 0.8 percentage points to 3.2%, the US by 0.8 points to 6.8%, and Germany by 0.9 points to 4.0% [9][10] - The expansion of fiscal policy is characterized by a shift from demand-side management to proactive supply-side investments, indicating a more aggressive fiscal approach that is not solely triggered by recession [9][10] Group 2: Banking Sector Analysis - The banking sector is projected to experience stable revenue growth with a gradual improvement in profit margins, driven by a narrowing of interest margin declines and a recovery in market sentiment [11][12] - The performance of listed banks is expected to diverge, with regional banks in areas like Jiangsu and Zhejiang likely to achieve higher profit growth compared to larger state-owned banks [11][12] - The non-performing loan (NPL) ratio is expected to remain stable at around 1.22%, with a slight decrease in the provision coverage ratio, indicating a manageable risk environment for banks [12][16] Group 3: Company-Specific Insights on Ecovacs - Ecovacs is projected to achieve a significant increase in net profit, with estimates ranging from 1.7 to 1.8 billion yuan, reflecting a year-on-year growth of 111-123% [17][18] - The company's new product lines, particularly the rolling drum products, are expected to enhance its market share in the mid-to-high-end segment, contributing to rapid growth in both domestic and international sales [17][18] - Despite challenges from subsidy reductions, Ecovacs is focusing on expanding its product offerings and enhancing its overseas market presence, particularly in Europe and North America [17][18]

Core Viewpoint - In 2026, overseas fiscal policies are expected to align with geopolitical factors, leading to a pro-cyclical expansion path. Fiscal policy is both a driver of economic resilience and a source of debt risk. The current debt situation is overextending future growth capabilities, and how to address this debt will determine the boundaries of monetary independence [1]. Group 1: Fiscal Policy Shift - In 2025, fiscal policies in the US, Europe, and Japan are transitioning from counter-cyclical to cross-cyclical, with a significant expansion of fiscal goals to include supply-side restructuring and defense spending. This shift indicates a more rigid approach to debt expansion [2][3]. - The constraints on fiscal expansion are weakening, as political and geopolitical pressures reduce the motivation for parties to impose debt limits. The risk of debt default is low for developed sovereign currency countries, transforming debt risk into liquidity risk, reflected in rising inflation expectations and interest rates [2][3]. Group 2: Fiscal Expansion in 2026 - In 2026, fiscal policies in the US, Europe, and Japan will see significant increases in defense spending, with Japan's deficit expected to rise by 0.8 percentage points to 3.2%, the US by 0.8 percentage points to 6.8%, and Germany by 0.9 percentage points to 4.0% [3][4]. - The focus of fiscal expansion will shift towards supply-side investments, particularly in defense, AI industry subsidies, and infrastructure investments, with defense spending in Germany expected to increase by 25% and in the US by 10% [3][4]. Group 3: Dual Nature of Fiscal Policy - The fiscal expansion will support economic growth in the US, Germany, and Japan, with the US expected to see a growth rate of 2.3% in 2026, driven by fiscal contributions of 0.5-0.6 percentage points [5][6]. - However, the accumulation of debt risks is also a concern, as the economic recovery is occurring alongside rising debt levels, leading to potential market disruptions [5][6]. Group 4: Implications for Monetary Policy - The methods for addressing fiscal issues will ultimately determine the boundaries of the Federal Reserve's independence. Traditional methods of debt reduction, such as fiscal consolidation and financial repression, face challenges in the current environment [6][7]. - The ongoing fiscal expansion may lead to a situation where monetary policy is increasingly influenced by fiscal decisions, eroding the independence of central banks [6][7].

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article is that global fiscal policies are shifting towards expansionary measures, driven by geopolitical and security concerns, which may redefine the boundaries of monetary independence and debt sustainability [1][9]. Group 2 - In 2025, global fiscal policies in the US, Europe, and Japan are transitioning from counter-cyclical to cross-cyclical, with a significant expansion of fiscal goals to include supply-side restructuring and defense spending [2][10]. - The constraints on fiscal expansion are weakening, as political pressures reduce the motivation for debt restraint, and the risk of debt default is low for developed sovereign currency nations [2][24]. Group 3 - By 2026, fiscal policies in developed economies will focus on supply-side investments, particularly in defense, AI, and infrastructure, marking a shift from traditional demand-side fiscal measures [3][52]. - The fiscal impulse in 2026 is expected to be stronger than in typical non-recession years, with Japan's deficit rate projected to rise to 3.2%, the US to 6.8%, and Germany to 4.0% [3][93]. Group 4 - The expansion of fiscal policies is characterized by a focus on defense spending, with Germany's defense budget expected to increase by 25% and the US by 10% in 2026 [3][71]. - The US will implement significant tax cuts, with a total reduction of $396 billion in 2026, a 47.7% increase from 2025, aimed at stimulating consumption and investment [61][64]. Group 5 - The dual nature of expansionary fiscal policies presents both growth opportunities and risks, as the accumulation of debt may challenge the independence of central banks [5][112]. - The economic recovery driven by fiscal expansion may not follow traditional patterns, as the reliance on government support could lead to increased systemic risks and a divergence between public and private sector growth [5][125].

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The target range for the 10 - year Treasury bond is 2 - 3%, with a central value of around 2.5%. Economic recovery is accelerating, inflation is rising, and the bond market's overall leverage ratio has increased. The report also analyzes the changes in bond custody volume and the behavior of different institutions in the bond market [7]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs Overall Situation - In December, the total bond custody volume of Shanghai Clearing House and China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd. (CCDC) was 178.55 trillion yuan, with a net monthly increase of 302.571 billion yuan, showing a decline in the incremental increase compared to the previous month. The custody volume of Shanghai Clearing House decreased by 204.504 billion yuan, while that of CCDC increased by 507.075 billion yuan, both with a slowdown in the incremental increase [2][3]. Bond Types - Interest - bearing bonds contributed the main increment in December. The custody volume of interest - bearing bonds was 123.15 trillion yuan, with a net monthly increase of 695.865 billion yuan; the custody volume of credit bonds was 33.88 trillion yuan, with a net monthly increase of 154.092 billion yuan; the custody volume of inter - bank certificates of deposit was 19.69 trillion yuan, with a net monthly decrease of 622.378 billion yuan [4]. Institutions - Commercial banks were the main purchasers of bonds. Their custody volume was 94.40 trillion yuan, with a net monthly increase of 256.262 billion yuan. Securities, broad - based funds, and overseas institutions all had a net decrease in custody volume [5]. Leverage - The overall leverage ratio of the bond market rose to 107.14% in December. The leverage ratios of commercial banks and non - bank institutions increased, while that of securities firms decreased [6].

Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. Core Viewpoints - The central bank announced two policy measures: reducing the interest rates of various structural monetary policy tools by 0.25 percentage points and improving and increasing support for structural tools. There is still room for reserve requirement ratio cuts and interest rate cuts in 2026. The target range for the 10-year Treasury bond is 2 - 3%, with a central value of 2.5% [6]. - The economic recovery falling short of expectations has been disproven. At the beginning of 2026, there may be loose credit and fiscal policies, accelerating the cyclical recovery [6]. - If there are loose monetary policies (such as reserve requirement ratio cuts, interest rate cuts, bond purchases), it will be a chance to reduce allocation, similar to 2025 [6]. - Inflation is rising, and attention should be paid to whether the month-on-month increase in PPI can remain positive [6]. - If the month-on-month inflation continues to rise, there is a possibility of tightened funds, and the yields of short-term bonds will also start to rise [6]. - Real estate is not used as a means to stabilize growth this time. Similar to the situation in the United States after 2008, real estate is a lagging indicator and may bottom out after the recovery of various economic indicators and the rise of the stock market [6]. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 12 - Month Financial Data Focus - **Social Financing**: In December, the new social financing was 2.21 trillion yuan, 64.62 billion yuan less than the same period last year, slightly exceeding the average of the same period from 2021 - 2024. The high base caused by the issuance of 2 trillion replacement government bonds at the end of 2024 and the front - heavy and back - light issuance rhythm of government bonds in 2025 led to a year - on - year decrease of 1.07 trillion yuan in government bond net financing in December, dragging down the year - on - year growth of social financing. However, driven by the implementation of policy - based financial instruments and the recovery of manufacturing prosperity, the net financing of corporate bonds and trust loans continued to increase. In December, entrusted loans, trust loans, and corporate bond net financing increased by 3.28 billion yuan, 5.28 billion yuan, and 17 billion yuan respectively compared with the same period in 2024 [4]. - **New Loans**: In December, new corporate and household loans showed a differentiated trend. Household new loans were 44.16 billion yuan less than the same period last year, with both short - term and medium - to - long - term loans decreasing year - on - year, indicating weak household demand and a more cautious consumption attitude. The decrease in medium - to - long - term loans may be related to the continued slump in the real estate market. Corporate new loans were 58 billion yuan more than the same period last year, with both short - term and medium - to - long - term loans increasing year - on - year. The issuance of new policy - based financial instruments has supported corporate loans. The manufacturing PMI returned to the expansion range in December, with the production index at 51.7% and the new order index above the boom - bust line, reflecting strong production and demand and active business operations, driving the year - on - year increase in corporate loans [5]. - **Money Supply**: In December, M1 increased by 3.8% year - on - year, a decrease of 1.1 percentage points from the previous value; M2 increased by 8.5% year - on - year, an increase of 0.5 percentage points from the previous value. The continuous decline of M1 year - on - year since September is mainly due to the base effect. In December, non - bank deposits decreased by 2.84 trillion yuan less than the same period last year, which may have driven the year - on - year growth of M2 [5]. Policy Measures - On January 15th, at the press conference, the central bank announced two policy measures: (1) reducing the interest rates of various structural monetary policy tools by 0.25 percentage points; (2) improving and increasing support for structural tools, such as increasing the quota of re - loans for scientific and technological innovation and technological transformation and expanding the scope of support, increasing the quota of re - loans for agriculture and small businesses, and setting up a special re - loan for private enterprises in the total quota. It also mentioned that it will flexibly conduct Treasury bond trading operations in the next step and pointed out that there is still room for reserve requirement ratio cuts and interest rate cuts in 2026 [6]. Bond Market Viewpoints - **Fundamentals**: The economic recovery falling short of expectations has been disproven. At the beginning of 2026, there may be loose credit and fiscal policies, accelerating the cyclical recovery [6]. - **Monetary Policy**: If there are loose monetary policies (such as reserve requirement ratio cuts, interest rate cuts, bond purchases), it will be a chance to reduce allocation, similar to 2025 [6]. - **Inflation**: Inflation is rising, and attention should be paid to whether the month - on - month increase in PPI can remain positive [6]. - **Funds Rate**: If the month - on - month inflation continues to rise, there is a possibility of tightened funds, and the yields of short - term bonds will also start to rise [6]. - **Real Estate**: Real estate is not used as a means to stabilize growth this time. Similar to the situation in the United States after 2008, real estate is a lagging indicator and may bottom out after the recovery of various economic indicators and the rise of the stock market [6]. - **Bonds**: The target range for the 10 - year Treasury bond is 2 - 3%, with a central value of 2.5% [6].