Group 1: CPI and PPI Divergence - In July, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) decreased by 0.1 percentage points year-on-year to 0%, while the Producer Price Index (PPI) remained flat at -3.6% year-on-year, with a month-on-month increase of 0.2 percentage points to -0.2%, slightly below the consensus expectation of -3.4% [7][3][11] Group 2: Export Shipping Data Decline - High tariffs have led to a decline in high-frequency data related to Chinese exports. In the first week of August, the average number of container ships departing from China to the U.S. was 53 vessels per day, down from 65 vessels in July. The total container ship load decreased from 500,000 TEU to 430,000 TEU [5][6] Group 3: Beijing Real Estate Policy Changes - On August 8, Beijing announced new real estate policies, including the cancellation of purchase restrictions and increased support for public housing loans. The market is observing whether other cities will follow suit with similar policies [7][8] Group 4: Divergence of RMB Middle Rate and Offshore Rate - At the end of July, the offshore RMB exchange rate rose to 7.21 against the USD but has since fluctuated around 7.17. The People's Bank of China has shown a more supportive stance towards the RMB exchange rate, with the middle rate rising to 7.13 on August 7, the highest since 2025 [9][11] Group 5: Excavator Sales and Operating Hours - In July, domestic excavator sales reached 7,306 units, a year-on-year increase of 17.2%. However, the average working hours for major construction machinery products fell to 80.8 hours, a year-on-year decrease of 6.91%. This decline in working hours may be attributed to the high-temperature season and weaker operational rates [11][12]

Core Viewpoint - The current liquidity level in the US remains healthy, but the focus should shift to the effectiveness of monetary policy stimulus, particularly the transmission of interest rate cuts to long-term rates, which is crucial for the recovery of the real economy [2][4][22] Group 1: Liquidity Status - Following the Silicon Valley Bank crisis, there has been no large-scale financial risk exposure in the US, and the stock market has recovered and reached new highs [4] - The US liquidity stock level is healthy, with concerns not stemming from insufficient liquidity but from potential mismatches and increased risk exposure due to further liquidity injections [4][11] - The current excess reserves in the US are approximately $900 billion, significantly higher than the $80 billion level during the 2019 repo market crisis [7] Group 2: Monetary Policy and Economic Impact - The effectiveness of interest rate cuts in stimulating the real economy is under scrutiny, as the transmission to long-term rates remains weak, limiting recovery in sectors like manufacturing and real estate [22] - The average duration of assets on bank balance sheets is increasing, raising concerns about interest rate sensitivity and liquidity risks [22][18] - The low supply of non-bond assets, such as commercial loans and residential mortgages, has led banks to allocate more to bond assets, further increasing average duration and interest rate risk [18] Group 3: Structural Changes in Financial System - The proportion of US Treasury securities in banks' loanable assets has increased by nearly 8 percentage points to 53%, primarily due to an increase in held-to-maturity assets [13] - The overall losses in the US banking sector amount to $410 billion, with approximately $260 billion stemming from held-to-maturity assets, which limits banks' credit supply capabilities [17] - The distribution of reserves has become more even, with the largest banks bearing the brunt of the Fed's balance sheet reduction, indicating a more resilient financial system [8][10]

Core Viewpoint - The fiscal revenue and expenditure in the second half of the year will face pressure, but the probability of additional deficits is low. It is expected that fiscal policy reserves will be utilized to cover the revenue shortfall caused by the issuance of childcare and elderly service consumption subsidies [2][6][11]. Group 1: Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Overview - In the first half of the year, the deviation of fiscal revenue and expenditure from the budget was limited, with national revenue falling short of the initial budget by 463 billion and expenditure lower by 1309 billion for the general public budget [4][6]. - The revenue and expenditure growth rates for the general public budget in the first half of 2025 were -0.3% and 3.4%, respectively, while the government fund revenue and expenditure growth rates were -2.4% and 30.0% [5][7]. Group 2: Projections for the Second Half of the Year - For the second half of the year, the expected growth rates for the general public budget revenue and expenditure are -4.5% and 1.5%, respectively, with a projected revenue shortfall of 516.6 billion and an expenditure shortfall of 547.2 billion compared to the budget [6][11]. - The second half of the year is anticipated to see government fund revenue and expenditure growth rates of -2.5% and 11.4%, respectively, with a budget shortfall exceeding 500 billion [6][11]. Group 3: Budget Management Strategies - In 2024, the highest deviation of the general public budget revenue from the budget reached 915.6 billion, but no additional deficit was added. Instead, measures such as strengthening tax collection and activating existing assets were employed to catch up with the budget [9][11]. - The central budget stabilization fund had a balance of 273.9 billion at the end of 2024, with 100 billion planned to be transferred in 2025, leaving a remaining balance of 173.9 billion [12].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the fiscal situation in China for the first half of the year, highlighting the reliance on central government financing while local government spending remains slow. It notes a significant increase in government bond financing and a shift in the use of special bonds towards debt repayment rather than project construction [2][4][6]. Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure - In the first half of the year, the net financing scale of government bonds reached 7.8 trillion yuan, an increase of 4.3 trillion yuan year-on-year, primarily due to special refinancing bonds and bonds for supplementing commercial bank capital being issued in this period [4]. - National fiscal revenue for the first half decreased by 0.6% year-on-year, while expenditure increased by 8.9%, slightly below the initial budget target of 9.3% [6]. - Central government revenue and expenditure growth rates were -2.5% and 37% respectively, both exceeding initial budget expectations, while local government revenue and expenditure growth rates fell short of targets [6][7]. Infrastructure Investment - Despite a 17.6% year-on-year increase in broad fiscal expenditure in June, infrastructure investment growth was only 5.3%, indicating a disconnect between fiscal spending and infrastructure development [7][10]. - The increase in fiscal expenditure was largely driven by one-time capital injections into commercial banks, which inflated June's expenditure figures [10]. Policy Signals - The article indicates a trend towards prioritizing social welfare spending, particularly in education, social security, and healthcare, with a 6.4% year-on-year increase in these areas, outpacing overall fiscal expenditure growth [10][12]. - Recent policy measures include pension increases, subsidies for elderly care, and initiatives for free preschool education, reflecting a focus on supporting vulnerable populations [12]. Special Bonds Usage - The issuance of special bonds accelerated significantly in June and July, with 63.1% of the annual target achieved by mid-year, compared to 44.4% in the previous year [13]. - The allocation of special bonds has shifted, with a growing proportion being used for debt repayment rather than project construction, raising concerns about future infrastructure funding [14][19]. - The article notes that the use of special bonds is now subject to a "negative list" management approach, expanding the potential applications of these funds [19].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the recent trends in commodity prices, economic indicators for July, and the implications of rising tariffs in the U.S. on international trade dynamics. Group 1: Commodity Price Trends - In July, commodity futures prices surged due to expectations of reduced competition, with polysilicon leading the price increase, followed by glass and coking coal [2] - However, in the last week of July, the trading activity cooled significantly due to policy guidance, resulting in sharp declines in previously rising commodities such as coking coal, lithium carbonate, industrial silicon, and glass, which fell by 21.2%, 13.7%, 12.2%, respectively [2] Group 2: Economic Indicators for July - The PMI for July decreased by 0.4 percentage points to 49.3, indicating a decline in economic activity compared to June [4] - The estimated PPI growth rate for July is around -3.3%, while the CPI year-on-year is approximately -0.2% [5] - Exports are expected to maintain resilience, with a projected growth rate of around 4% for July [6] - Retail sales growth is anticipated to be around 4.6%, reflecting a slight decline in the "trade-in" program [7] - Industrial output is expected to show a year-on-year increase of about 5.8% [7] - Fixed asset investment growth is projected at 2.8%, with real estate sales showing weak sentiment [8] - Social financing is expected to rise to approximately 9.1% in July, supported by government bonds [9] Group 3: U.S. Tariff Increases - On July 31, the White House announced an executive order to reset "reciprocal tariff" rates for certain countries, effective August 7, with Canada’s tariffs effective August 1 [10] - The new tariff structure includes a minimum rate of 10% for allied countries, a 15% rate for countries with small trade surpluses with the U.S., and higher rates for major trading partners like Canada and Mexico, which face tariffs of 35% and 25%, respectively [10][12] - Compared to the existing rates in May, the upcoming reciprocal tariffs represent a significant increase, which may shift traders from exporting to inventory management [12] Group 4: Government Debt Issuance - In July, government bond issuance slightly decreased, with a total issuance of 2.4 trillion yuan and net financing of 1.25 trillion yuan, an increase of 632.2 billion yuan year-on-year [12] - As of the end of July 2025, the net financing scale of government bonds reached 9.0 trillion yuan, with an issuance progress of 65.3% [12]

Group 1 - The Federal Reserve's decision on interest rate cuts is influenced by a complex interplay between monetary policy and political positions, rather than being a straightforward economic issue [1][14]. - The recent FOMC meeting saw two dissenting votes for the first time in 32 years, reflecting a shift in the political landscape rather than a significant change in monetary policy dynamics [4][5]. - The removal of the phrase "uncertainty further decreases" from Powell's statements indicates ongoing concerns about the unpredictability of Trump's policies, which adds to the complexity of the economic environment [6][12]. Group 2 - The significant fluctuations in GDP growth rates are primarily driven by Trump's tariff policies, which have led to erratic import behaviors and inventory investments, masking the underlying weakening of domestic economic momentum [7][9]. - The private domestic final purchases (PDFP) growth rate has been revised downwards, indicating a decline in the internal economic strength of the U.S., which is heavily reliant on consumer spending [9][12]. - Powell's hawkish stance is characterized by a focus on inflation risks over employment concerns, suggesting a tighter monetary policy approach to combat inflation, despite the complexities introduced by external factors like tariffs [12][14]. Group 3 - The decision to cut interest rates in September appears to be data-driven, with the potential for political pressures from Trump regarding the Federal Reserve's actions, especially concerning debt servicing costs [17][14]. - The upcoming Jackson Hole global central bank meeting is anticipated to be a critical moment for assessing Powell's commitment to a hawkish monetary policy stance amidst evolving economic conditions [14][17].

三中全会在去年7月召开，时隔15个月后，四中全会将在今年10月召开，标志着下一阶段我国政治经 济发展方向更加清晰明确。 四中全会时间及议程，下半年经济政策思路，综合整治内卷的进一步说明。 文：国金宏观宋雪涛/赵宏鹤 7月下旬的政治局会议，是总结上半年经济成绩、部署下半年经济工作的重要会议，此次会议提到的三 件大事值得重点关注。 第一件大事，是宣布了四中全会的召开时间和主要议程。 作为四中全会的重头戏，"十五五"规划（2026-2030）起到承上启下的关键作用。从2021年建党百 年到踏上新征程，我国将用"十四五""十五五""十六五"3个五年规划期实现2035年远景目标，即基本 实现社会主义现代化。随着"十四五"收官在即，"十五五"的几方面内容值得重点关注。 一是经济目标的设定。 2035年远景目标总体上是以定性描述为主，相应的，"十四五"规划也没有设 定5年的GDP定量目标，而是描述为"保持在合理区间、各年度视情提出"。但当时全球经济正在经历公 共卫生事件，不确定性较高，事件结束后，2023-2025年连续3年的经济增速目标均设定在"5%左 右"，因此"十五五"规划如何处理值得关注。 二是重大工程的安排。 重 ...

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article highlights that the significant increase in individual income tax (IIT) is primarily due to improved tax collection efficiency and enforcement, while the divergence between value-added tax (VAT) and corporate income tax (CIT) is mainly influenced by one-time factors at the beginning of the year. Additionally, the negative shift in non-tax revenue reflects improvements in the business environment [1][3][11]. Group 2 - In the first half of the year, national tax revenue reached 9.29 trillion yuan, showing a year-on-year decline of 1.2%, with VAT, CIT, and consumption tax growth rates at 2.8%, -1.9%, and 1.7% respectively. Despite weak growth in overall tax revenue, IIT saw a notable increase of 8% year-on-year [3][6]. - The growth in IIT is not aligned with improvements in residents' disposable income, which only increased by 4.7%. High-income earners contribute significantly to IIT, with those earning over 1 million yuan accounting for over 50% of the total IIT collected [6][10]. - The increase in IIT is attributed to several factors, including the full implementation of the "Golden Tax" Phase IV, which enhances tax collection efficiency through data integration and analysis, and the implementation of the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for overseas income reporting [8][10]. - The rise in stock transfers and employee stock incentives, particularly in high-income cities like Beijing and Shanghai, has also contributed to the increase in IIT. In the first half of the year, Beijing's IIT revenue grew by 7.8% [10]. - The growth in dividend income from listed companies, with a total dividend payout of nearly 2.4 trillion yuan, has further supported the increase in IIT [10]. Group 3 - The divergence between VAT and CIT is unusual, with VAT growing by 2.8% while CIT declined by 1.9%. This divergence is attributed to "involution" competition leading to increased revenue without corresponding profit growth, as well as one-time factors affecting CIT collection early in the year [11][12]. - The decline in non-tax revenue, which reached 2.27 trillion yuan with a year-on-year growth of only 3.7%, is primarily due to reduced support from the monetization of state-owned assets and improvements in the business environment leading to lower administrative fees and penalties [15][16][17].

相较于育儿补贴规模的多少，更重要的是政策对于扩大内需和"投资于人"的积极态 度，育儿补贴落地有望成为市场风格切换的催化剂。 2、育儿补贴央地财政如何分担？ 文：国金宏观宋雪涛/联系人张馨月 国家育儿补贴制度实施方案7月28日公布。从2025年1月1日起，对符合法律法规规定生育的3周岁以 下婴幼儿发放补贴，至其年满3周岁。育儿补贴按年发放，现阶段国家基础标准为每孩每年3600元。 其中，对2025年1月1日之前出生、不满3周岁的婴幼儿，按应补贴月数折算计发补贴。 1、育儿补贴规模有多大？ 《育儿补贴制度实施方案》明确，"从2025年1月1日起，对符合法律法规规定生育的3周岁以下婴幼儿 发放补贴，至其年满3周岁"。 此次育儿补贴的发放对象可以分为两类群体： 一是2025年1月1日之前出生、不满3周岁的婴幼儿，对应2022-2024年2812万人的出生人口。《方 案》明确"对2025年1月1日之前出生、不满3周岁的婴幼儿，按应补贴月数折算计发补贴"，对应的补 贴规模共计854亿元。 二是2025年1月1日之后出生的婴幼儿，对应2025年的新出生人口，预计960万人左右，按照现阶段 国家基础标准为每孩每年3600元补 ...

沿着最小阻力的方向，符合人性，但不一定通往最优结果，突破阻力是改革的应有之 义。"反内卷"不等于"涨价去产能"，是一个需要中央、地方和司法体系协同配合的改 革过程。高度重视反内卷政策，准确把握改革方向。 文：国金宏观宋雪涛/赵宏鹤 一、阻力最小的方向 对市场来说，要在短时间内参与"反内卷"主题，上游行业同样是阻力最小的方向： 2016 年供改记忆 犹新——逻辑直观容易理解，市场流动性宽松——情绪容易催化，商品价格和行业估值处于历史低位 ——筹码结构容易拉升。 但阻力最小的方向不一定通往最优的结果。 一个简单的例子是，当前形势下，如果反内卷仅限于上游 涨价去产能，那么真正深陷于内卷的中下游行业特别是新兴行业，将会面临更大的竞争压力，甚至加剧 内卷。回顾过往， 21 年的"双碳"一度出现合成谬误，好在数月之后得到纠偏。 对市场来说，流动性、情绪、反通缩预期和筹码结构的铺垫固然可以降低阻力，但拉长时间仍需经历现 实的检验，这需要切实的供给收缩和需求回暖，本质上是要对齐高层改革的意图，否则将会面临证伪的 风险。 二、改革之路 要实现最优结果，就要突破很多阻力，这也是改革的应有之义。 物理学里有一个"最小阻力定律"，指 ...