尽管联储对于2025年的降息预期一直保持在2次（50bp），但这次如此清晰的鸽派信号，加强的不仅 仅是9月降息25bp，更是年内连续降息的可能。 鲍威尔的杰克逊霍尔会议发言分为两个部分，第一部分是经济回顾与展望，第二部分是对联储货币政策 框架的修改。在整个演讲的最开头，鲍威尔便直白地说出了"风险平衡似乎正在发生变化(the balance of risks appears to be shifting)"，这给整个演讲奠定了鸽派基调。 一、鲍威尔的"杰克逊霍尔"大撤退 鲍威尔对劳动力市场总结为"当下处于一种供需双弱的奇异平衡状态"，更为关键的是"就业的下行风险 正 在 上 升 ， 且 如 果 这 些 风 险 成 为 现 实 ， 可 能 会 以 大 幅 增 加 裁 员 和 失 业 率 上 升 的 形 式 迅 速 实 现 （downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising un ...

Core Viewpoint - The core variable of US trade policy remains Trump himself, and his controversial tariff strategy is expected to be prevalent in the next two to three years, with any country aiming to gain future discourse power needing to become the "greatest common divisor" connecting different trade circles [2][23]. Group 1: Trump's Tariff System 2.0 - During his first term, Trump initiated a trade revolution centered on "America First," using tariffs as a primary weapon, which ignited global trade disputes and altered the existing international trade landscape [4][5]. - In his second term, Trump's tariff tactics evolved into a more structured and comprehensive approach, consisting of four main components: reciprocal tariffs for trade balance, punitive tariffs for specific reasons, tariffs on transshipment to combat tax avoidance, and industry barriers to protect domestic industries [5][6]. Group 2: Reciprocal Tariffs - The "reciprocal tariffs" create a trade circle centered around the US, with countries like the UK and Australia enjoying a baseline tax rate of 10%, while others face higher rates based on their trade relations and concessions made to the US [6][7]. - As of August 29, 2023, new regulations require small packages valued at $800 or less to pay certain taxes upon entry, with specific rates based on the country of origin [7]. Group 3: Punitive Tariffs - Trump increasingly uses punitive tariffs as a core tool for handling diplomatic matters, with various justifications, including combating cross-border crime and exerting geopolitical pressure [9][10]. - The US has implemented significant tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico, and additional tariffs on Chinese products, with the potential for further increases based on cooperation in drug trafficking issues [9][10]. Group 4: Transshipment Tariffs - To close potential loopholes in tariff policies, the Trump administration established a "transshipment" clause allowing customs to impose a 40% tariff on goods attempting to circumvent tariffs through third countries [11]. - The challenge lies in the ambiguous definition of "transshipment," which complicates enforcement and creates uncertainty for US customs [12][13]. Group 5: Industry Tariffs - The US has invoked the 1962 Trade Expansion Act's Section 232 to impose high tariffs on strategically important industries, aiming to reverse the trend of industrial hollowing and enhance domestic supply chain resilience [16][17]. - Tariffs have been applied to steel, aluminum, and are expected to extend to semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, with a notable exemption for companies investing in the US [16][17][18]. Group 6: Oral Agreements and Execution Discrepancies - Tariffs serve as a preliminary tool in trade negotiations, with the Trump administration relying heavily on oral agreements, leading to confusion and disputes over key terms [20][21]. - Discrepancies in the interpretation of agreements have hindered finalizing trade deals, as seen in negotiations with Japan and South Korea [20][21][22]. Group 7: Transition to Inventory Reduction Cycle - Following the implementation of high tariffs, the US has entered a phase of inventory reduction, with significant declines in inventory growth rates for durable and non-durable goods [28][29]. - The shift in import demand is attributed to the finalization of tariff policies and the completion of pre-tariff procurement, leading to a focus on inventory digestion and price adjustments [29][30]. Group 8: Global Trade Landscape Transformation - The global trade structure is undergoing a profound transformation towards a multipolar development, moving away from reliance on the US-China economic model to a more decentralized network of regional trade alliances [23][30]. - Countries aiming to secure future discourse power must position themselves as essential hubs within these diverse trade networks [23].

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article is that the recovery of global risk appetite and stock market increases are primarily driven by the loosening of dollar liquidity, with potential risks arising from changes in Federal Reserve policies or cross-border capital flows [2][4] - The article discusses the phenomenon of TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) trading, which has led to increased confidence among investors and a bullish atmosphere in various global markets, including US, European, and Asian stocks [4][5] Group 2 - The improvement in global risk appetite is attributed to the loosening of dollar liquidity, which is closely linked to the Federal Reserve's monetary policy and cross-border capital flows [5][6] - The dollar index has significantly declined, dropping 2.4% in the past quarter and 10% year-to-date, which has positively impacted non-US stock markets [7][9] - The actual interest rates of US Treasury bonds have decreased, providing a foundation for risk sentiment release, with a decline of over 20 basis points since April [9][11] - Global central banks have accelerated monetary supply, with a notable increase in the growth rate of global central bank money supply by nearly 7 percentage points in the past quarter [11][14] - The cost of offshore dollar financing has decreased, indicating a more favorable liquidity environment for non-US equity markets [14][16] Group 3 - There is a noticeable trend of foreign capital inflow into non-US equity markets, with A-shares seeing a 0.75% increase in foreign ownership value compared to the end of last year [16][19] - Various Asian markets, including Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, have experienced net inflows of foreign capital since July, contrasting with the previous 12 months of net outflows [19][20] Group 4 - The article highlights concerns regarding the effectiveness of capital expenditures by technology giants amid the current AI boom, with an average capital expenditure growth rate of 18% projected for tech stocks from 2021 to 2024 [20][22] - The current market structure shows a "barbell" effect, with significant gains in both large tech companies and small-cap stocks, indicating a potential increase in market fragility [22][26] Group 5 - The "Buffett Indicator," which measures the ratio of total market capitalization to nominal GDP, has reached a historical high of 2.1, suggesting a potential overvaluation of the market [26][28] - Comparisons of risk premiums across global indices reveal that US and Indian stocks have low risk premiums, while A-shares and Korean stocks maintain higher levels [31][34] - The article concludes that the high valuation levels across major stock indices, combined with the low risk premiums in developed markets, indicate a potential bubble in the current market environment [39]

鲍威尔很难在杰克逊霍尔会议给出任何清晰的降息指引，当前积极定价的9月降息 25bp将直面联储主席的抗争。如果有指引，那更可能是引导鹰派降息预期：年内更少 的降息幅度，更高的终点利率水平。 文：国金宏观宋雪涛/联系人钟天 尽管过去一年联储已经下调了100bp的基准利率，但当下美国的宏观环境比去年同期更为严峻，美国 经济进入2025年后增速的明显放缓也需要用降息加以对冲。 在这个过程中，降息对实体经济（信用）的刺激将主要来自于金融条件宽松、财富效应扩散以及预期改 善。在犹豫之中，美国硬数据的下行趋势或还将延续；鲍威尔在杰克逊霍尔会议上的态度也值得关注。 从最关心的降息路径来看，我们认为鲍威尔很难在杰克逊霍尔会议给出清晰的降息指引，当前积极定价 的9月降息25bp将直面联储主席的抗争。如果有指引，那更可能是引导鹰派降息预期：年内更少的降 息幅度，更高的终点利率水平。 7月非农报告中对前值的大幅下修一度带来恐慌，但随着市场意识到应当关注修正的"比例"而非"绝对 值"后，衰退预期开始消散。 就业的疲软也被归因于劳动力供给的趋势走弱和短期噪音的"坏运气共振"；这份报告对9月降息的推动 大致止步于此，难以一锤定音降息的发生 ...

关于本栏目 高频数据难懂？挖掘信息不易？【国金高频图鉴】每周一期，与您一同从高频数据库中抽丝剥茧，看懂全球经济的新变化。如需底层数据库，欢迎联系国金宏观团 队。 7 月经济数据公布 8 月初汽车销量转负 美国关税税率进一步上行 韩国出口高频开始走弱 8 月主要大宗商品现货表现偏弱 7月经济数据呈现外需强于内需、生产强于需求、不变价强于现价的格局。 生产端， 7月 工增、服务业生产指数不变价同比增长5.7%、5.8%，但 价格处于年内低位。 01 7月经济数据公布 #本期Headline# 展望后续，随着今年7月下旬第三批补贴资金下发各地，部分地区"以旧换新"逐步重启，政策对汽车补贴的力度有所加强，但汽车价格战力度减弱，消费者 购车成本上行，观望情绪或维持高位。 需求端， 出口一枝独秀。7月社零同比增长3.7%，前值4.8%，固定资产投资完成额1-7月累计同比下滑1.2个百分点至1.6%，制造业、基建、房地产投资累计 同比均回落。 相比于实体经济走弱，7月社融同比增长9%，M1同比增长5.6%，创年内新高。 我们估算7月GDP不变价增速在5%左右，7月GDP平减指数为-1.4%，对应现价GDP增速在3.6%左右 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the need for a stable monetary policy in response to ongoing economic challenges, highlighting the importance of implementing a moderately loose monetary policy and utilizing structural monetary policy tools [4]. Group 1: Monetary Policy Execution Report Highlights - The second quarter monetary policy execution report shows a more positive outlook on price recovery, indicating that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is expected to see a moderate rebound due to various positive factors [5]. - The report notes that the Producer Price Index (PPI) may reach a bottom and start to recover, aided by a low base from the previous year and the impact of "anti-involution" on commodity prices [5]. - However, July economic data showed a significant decline, with fixed asset investment growth dropping by 1.2 percentage points to 1.6% and retail sales growth falling by 1.1 percentage points to 3.7% [5]. Group 2: Policy Tools and Measures - The report indicates that there will be no reduction in reserve requirements or interest rates, maintaining a "quantity-wide and price-stable" monetary policy approach [7]. - The average interest rate on new RMB loans decreased by 15 basis points to 3.29%, with net interest margins for commercial banks reaching historical lows [7]. - The central bank emphasizes the need to improve the efficiency of fund usage and prevent capital from flowing into the capital market at low prices, which could inflate asset prices [8]. Group 3: Structural Support Initiatives - The report highlights four key areas for structural support: small and micro financial services, financial support for technological innovation, credit structure optimization, and financial support for consumption [12]. - Approximately 70% of new loans are allocated to the technology sector, with double-digit growth rates, indicating a focus on promoting the development of the technology bond market [14]. - The report also mentions the importance of coordinating monetary credit policies with fiscal measures, such as providing interest subsidies for personal consumption loans and loans to service industry entities [14].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the impact of tariff changes on U.S.-China trade relations, highlighting a decline in U.S. import growth and the subsequent effects on China's exports, while also noting opportunities for China to benefit from exports to ASEAN and Africa before new tariffs take effect [3][4][5]. Group 1: U.S. Import Trends and China's Export Dynamics - U.S. import growth has shifted from 31% in March to -2.9% in June, indicating a move into a destocking phase [3]. - China's exports to the U.S. saw a decline, with a 44% drop in June, and a subsequent weakening in July, contributing to a 3.3 percentage point decrease in China's overall export growth [3][4]. - Despite the decline in U.S. imports from China, exports to ASEAN and Africa have surged, with U.S. imports from ASEAN maintaining a growth rate of around 30% from April to June [4][5]. Group 2: Export Opportunities in ASEAN and Africa - China's exports to Vietnam increased significantly, with machinery and electrical equipment seeing growth rates of 35.3% and 44.9% respectively from January to June [4]. - Exports to Africa also showed strong growth, with a 42.8% increase in July, contributing 1.9 percentage points to China's overall export growth [5]. - The article notes that the "export rush" to ASEAN and Africa may face challenges with the introduction of higher tariffs on August 8, which could pressure China's re-export trade [5]. Group 3: European Union Export Growth - China's exports to the EU grew by 9.2% in July, driven by improved economic conditions in the EU, which is China's second-largest export market [9][10]. - The increase in exports to the EU is attributed to China's competitive advantages in capital goods, with significant growth in exports of electrical machinery and vehicles [9][10]. - The EU's economic stability, with a GDP growth of 1.5% in Q2 2025, supports the resilience of Chinese exports to this region [10][11]. Group 4: Short-term Demand Challenges - The article highlights potential short-term demand declines, particularly from the U.S., which could negatively impact China's export performance [13][14]. - The effects of tariffs are expected to lead to a sharp decline in exports, with a notable drop from 9% in March to -21% in April for exports to the U.S. [14]. - The overall export share for China has increased to 16.4% among major sample countries, but the demand side pressures may limit further growth [13].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the implications of the recent U.S.-China trade negotiations, particularly focusing on the potential threat of secondary tariffs and the overall strategic stability in U.S.-China relations [4][5][6]. Summary by Sections Trade Negotiations and Tariff Delays - On August 12, Trump signed an executive order to delay 24% of reciprocal tariffs for 90 days while maintaining 10% tariffs, which was anticipated by the market [4]. - The delay occurred at the last moment, suggesting a possible deterrent strategy [4]. Secondary Tariff Threats - Trump's threat to impose a 25% secondary tariff on China is not merely about increasing oil purchases but is aimed at leveraging China's influence on the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire [5][6]. - The U.S. trade war has not effectively pressured China’s manufacturing or exports, and it has provided other countries with reasons to remain passive [5]. Energy Security Concerns - The secondary tariff threat touches on China's energy security, which is a more sensitive issue compared to trade in oil or agricultural products [6]. - The Chinese government has expressed strong opposition to unilateral sanctions and the trade war, emphasizing that there are no winners in such conflicts [6]. U.S.-Russia Relations and Its Impact - Trump's dual approach towards Russia includes military support for Ukraine and economic pressure through tariffs on countries buying Russian oil [6]. - A successful U.S.-Russia meeting could reduce the immediate need for secondary tariffs against China [6]. Future of U.S.-China Relations - The article predicts that U.S.-China relations will remain "strategically stable" and gradually improve, setting the stage for potential high-level meetings [7]. - The U.S. has specific demands from China regarding issues like rare earths and fentanyl, but the leverage has diminished recently [7]. Negotiation Dynamics - Achieving significant breakthroughs in negotiations will take time and depend on the outcomes of future high-level dialogues [7]. - The current trade war may hinder the U.S. from effectively engaging allies, as countries may choose to wait and see how U.S.-China relations evolve [7].

Core Viewpoint - The current market rally is driven by the rising sentiment among retail investors and the return of foreign capital, with insurance funds providing long-term support. The sustainability of this trend depends on the progress of household financial management migration and the global liquidity environment under a weak dollar [2][4]. Group 1: Market Overview - In July, the A-share market experienced a "bottom-up" bull market atmosphere, with the ChiNext Index rising over 8% for the month and daily trading volumes in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets frequently exceeding 1.5 trillion [4]. - The improvement in market sentiment is attributed to the easing of Sino-U.S. relations and tariff issues, along with the maturation of TACO trading and expectations of interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve, which have provided support for dollar liquidity [4]. Group 2: Types of Market Participants National Team - The central government’s capital, represented by Central Huijin Investment, has been absent from the market, with net outflows from broad-based ETFs since May, while industry-specific ETFs saw sustained inflows in July [5]. Institutions - Institutional "super large orders" have seen continuous net outflows since July, indicating limited motivation for public funds to increase positions. The average daily trading volume in key sectors like technology, finance, and consumption has been rising [5][6]. - As of the second quarter of 2025, the equity position of actively managed public funds in A-shares is at 71.4%, a decrease of 3.8 percentage points over the past year, with total net assets at 3.4 trillion, the lowest in 20 quarters [5]. Retail Investors - Retail investors have emerged as the main source of incremental funds during the July bull market, with new account openings on the Shanghai Stock Exchange reaching 1.96 million, above the 60th percentile level over the past three years [7]. - The net inflow of small orders (below 40,000 yuan) increased by 39% month-on-month in July, and the total trading volume on the A-share "Dragon and Tiger List" rose by 7.5% compared to June [7][8]. Foreign Capital - Foreign capital has shown signs of recovery, with average daily trading volume of northbound funds increasing by 36.3% in July compared to June, marking the first time since the "924 market" that both daily trading volume and market share have risen simultaneously [8][9]. - The net inflow of ETFs focused on investing in China reached $199 million in the past month, surpassing the total for the previous three months and accounting for 47% of last year's total net inflow [9]. Group 3: Future Outlook - The continuation of the A-share and H-share market rally will depend on the progress of household financial management migration and the global liquidity released by a weak dollar [9].

Core Viewpoint - The meeting between the US and Russian leaders marks the formal initiation of peace talks, with expectations for a principled framework, but the path to a comprehensive ceasefire remains long and challenging. The long-term outcome will primarily be determined by military strength, while the short-term may help ease US-China risks [2]. Group 1: Trump's First 200 Days - In the first 100 days, Trump actively sought to mediate the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but his approach faced significant controversy, leading to strained relations with traditional European allies and Ukraine [5]. - Trump's isolationist and pro-Russian stance caused considerable upheaval, prompting the EU to initiate an €800 billion "rearmament" plan and increasing distrust towards the US, reflected in the decline of the dollar index from 110 in January to 98 in late April [6]. - During the second 100 days, Trump shifted focus away from mediation efforts after unsuccessful attempts to coordinate talks, instead prioritizing domestic tax cuts and external tariff negotiations [7][10]. Group 2: Recent Developments and Negotiation Landscape - The third 100 days saw Trump return to mediating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, adjusting his stance to increase military aid to Ukraine while threatening sanctions against Russia and countries purchasing Russian oil [11]. - The summer offensive by Russia achieved limited territorial gains, with an average advance of 488 square kilometers per month from May to July, which is still less than 1% of Ukraine's territory [11]. - The upcoming meeting between Trump and Putin on August 15 is anticipated to yield some form of agreement or consensus, differing from previous talks without direct leader involvement [12][13]. Group 3: Assessment of Negotiation Prospects - The meeting is expected to signify the formal start of peace negotiations, with potential for a framework agreement, but achieving a comprehensive ceasefire in the short term remains unlikely due to numerous detailed issues [16]. - The conditions for negotiation have become more pragmatic, with Russia willing to agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine withdraws from Donetsk, although significant political risks remain for Ukraine [14][15]. - The outcome of the negotiations will largely depend on battlefield realities, particularly the situation following the summer offensive, with potential implications for gold and energy prices, as well as US-China relations [16].