Core Viewpoints - The current liquidity assessment indicates that overall liquidity remains relatively ample, supporting financial asset valuations, despite a decline in M1 and a significant drop in enterprise deposits [3][4][12] - Future liquidity is expected to face challenges due to a decrease in interbank certificates of deposit and rising loan bases, leading to a forecasted decline in M2 growth in the first quarter of 2026 [4][5] - The current monetary policy focuses on structural adjustments and timing, with an emphasis on stimulating investment in supported sectors while controlling capacity expansion in weaker demand areas [8][36][38] Group 1: Reasons for M2 Year-on-Year Growth - M2 increased by 8.5% year-on-year in December, with a monthly addition of 3.3 trillion yuan, driven by a narrowing drag from other factors and an increase in bank claims on non-financial institutions [14][15][44] - The narrowing drag from other factors is attributed to a decrease in bond issuance and a return of funds to the non-bank sector due to the maturity of interbank certificates of deposit [18][19] - The growth in bank claims on non-financial institutions is primarily from increased loans to enterprises, but this growth is expected to be unsustainable due to high base effects and weak demand [25][40] Group 2: Reasons for M1 Year-on-Year Decline - The new M1 decreased by 3.8% year-on-year in December, primarily due to a decline in the old M1, while household demand for current deposits remained stable [28][31] Group 3: Impact of December Financial Data on Liquidity Assessment - The ratio of new household deposits to new M2 remains low, indicating overall macro liquidity is still relatively ample, but there is a potential shift from real to virtual assets as enterprise deposits decline [12][32] - The increase in non-bank deposits aligns with a surge in equity market transactions, while the drop in enterprise deposits may negatively impact expectations for economic recovery [12][32] - The December M2 increase is seen as a short-term fluctuation, with a high probability of M2 decline in the first quarter of 2026, suggesting a potential marginal decrease in overall macro liquidity [12][32] Group 4: Information from the National New Office Meeting - The meeting outlined eight monetary policies to support the real economy, including a 0.25 percentage point reduction in various structural monetary policy tool rates and increased loan quotas for small and private enterprises [36][37] - The focus is on structural adjustments, with the central bank aiming to stimulate investment in supported sectors while managing supply in weaker demand areas [36][38]

文 ： 华创证券首席经济学家 张瑜（执业证号：S0360518090001） 联系人： 袁玲玲（微信 Yuen43） 一 、中纪委全会的四大关注点 中国共产党第二十届中央纪律检查委员会第五次全体会议，于 2026 年 1 月 12 日至 14 日在北京举行。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平出席全会并发表重 要讲话。中共中央政治局常委、中央纪律检查委员会书记李希代表中央纪委常委会作工作报告《以更高标准、更实举措推进全面从严治党，为实现"十五五"时期目标任务提供 坚强保障》 （参考往年情况，或于 2 月下旬发布报告全文） 。 （一） 金融、国企、能源、开发区、招投标仍是重点行业 2025 年和 2026 年中纪委全会中，金融、国企、能源、开发区、招投标这五个行业，连续两年均被列为年度反腐重点行业。 其中对于金融行业， 2018 年十九届中纪委二次 全会以来，每次会议都将其列入重点行业； 2023 年，二十届中纪委二次全会首次将其放在首位，到今年已连续四年位居首位。 | 时间 | কার্যা | 重点行业 | | --- | --- | --- | | 2026年1月12日至14日 | 二十届中央纪委 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article focuses on the reform of the housing provident fund system, emphasizing the need for improvements in fund management efficiency, loan limits, and the expansion of flexible employment personnel trials [2][5][19]. Group 1: Overview of the Provident Fund - The housing provident fund system was established in 1994, with the first regulations introduced in 1999, specifying its use for purchasing, building, or renovating self-occupied housing [4][12]. - By 2024, the total balance of the provident fund exceeded 10 trillion yuan, with 176 million contributors, a 1% year-on-year increase, and a total contribution of 3.6 trillion yuan, up 4.7% year-on-year [4][12]. - The amount withdrawn from the fund reached 2.8 trillion yuan in 2024, marking a 4.1% increase year-on-year, with a notable rise in withdrawals for rental and old community renovations, growing by 33% and 147% respectively [4][13]. Group 2: Recent Policy Direction - Recent policies have emphasized the need to deepen the reform of the housing provident fund system, with the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2025 highlighting the importance of this reform in stabilizing the real estate market [5][16]. - The People's Daily has indicated that the reform aims to ensure that individuals can easily access and utilize these funds to improve their housing conditions [5][16]. Group 3: Local Adjustments - In 2025, various local governments have made adjustments to provident fund policies, including lowering down payment ratios, supporting withdrawals for down payments, and expanding the scope of fund usage [5][17]. - Specific measures include increasing loan limits, allowing fund withdrawals for property management fees, and enhancing rental withdrawal limits [5][17]. Group 4: Future Focus Areas - There is a need to improve the efficiency of fund management, particularly addressing the low interest rate of 1.5% on provident fund accounts, which may not keep pace with inflation [19]. - Increasing the withdrawal limits for the provident fund is also a priority, especially in first-tier cities where housing prices are significantly higher than the current maximum loan limits [19]. - The expansion of trials for flexible employment personnel is anticipated, with 36 cities already participating as of the end of 2024, and further efforts to broaden the usage of the provident fund for rent and property fees are expected [20].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the economic goals and major project arrangements for the 2026 provincial meetings in China, with a focus on the economic targets set by various provinces, particularly Zhejiang, which has adopted a range for its GDP growth target for the first time [3][4]. Economic Goals - Zhejiang has set its GDP growth target for 2026 at a range of 5% to 5.5%, aiming for better results in practice, compared to last year's target of around 5.5% [4][7]. - The national GDP target is approximately 5% for 2026, indicating a potential trend towards setting range-based targets among provinces [4][6]. Major Projects - Zhejiang plans to initiate 1,678 major projects with an annual investment of 1.1 trillion yuan, an increase from last year's target of over 1 trillion yuan [4][7]. - The province's focus includes significant investments in artificial intelligence, aiming for a revenue growth of over 20% in this sector [4][7]. Employment and CPI Targets - The target for urban employment in Zhejiang remains consistent with last year, aiming to ensure over 1 million new urban jobs [4][6]. - The Consumer Price Index (CPI) target is maintained at around 2% for the year [4][6]. Urban Development - The target for urban village renovations in Zhejiang has significantly decreased to 14,000 households from 60,000 last year, reflecting a reduction of approximately 77% [4][6]. Summary of Provincial Meetings - The article outlines the scheduled dates for the 2026 provincial meetings across various provinces, highlighting that several major economic provinces will hold their meetings in late January [5][6].

1 、 12 月，中国出口同比不仅没因基数问题回落，反而较上月回升 0.7 个点。与 PMI 新出口订单的大幅回升对应，可能既有外需景气也有年末节前一定的生 产前置因素。 文 ： 华创证券首席经济学家 张瑜（执业证号：S0360518090001） 联系人：夏雪（微信SuperSummerSnow） 事项 12 月我国以美元计算出口同比 6.6% ，预期 3% ，前值 5.9% ； 12 月以美元计价进口同比 5.7% ，预期 0.9% ，前值 1.9% 。 核心观点 3 、对于集成电路 ，或受益于以美国为首的发达市场 AI 投资拉动的 AI 进口需求。 2025 年 1~3 季度，美国 AI 相关投资实际同比增速高达 14.4% （ 2024 年为 8.2% ）， AI 科技资本品实际进口量同比 53.2% （ 2024 年为 41.8% ）。在这个过程中，中国出口或通过全球供应链"间接出口"从中受益，表现为电子 中间品（以集成电路为代表）出口偏强。 4 、对于电脑， 设备偏弱，零件附件出口偏强 。自动数据处理设备及其零部件中，自动数据处理设备出口占比 42% ，目前最新 1~11 月累计同比增速 -10. ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the inflation trends in the United States for 2025 and the potential risks for 2026, emphasizing that inflation may not be a precondition for interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve but rather a response to economic conditions, with significant risks stemming from additional fiscal stimulus [2][3][4]. Summary by Sections 2025 US Inflation Overview - In 2025, the US inflation showed a reverse N-shaped trend with CPI year-on-year rates of 2.7%, 2.4%, 2.9%, and 2.7%, while core CPI rates were 3.1%, 2.8%, 3.1%, and 2.6% respectively [2][8]. - The CPI components include food (approximately 13.6% weight), energy (6.4%), core goods (19.3%), rent (33.7%), and super core services (27%) [8][11]. - The moderate recovery in CPI during Q2 and Q3 was primarily driven by core goods and energy, influenced by tariffs and base effects [11][12]. - The impact of tariffs on inflation was manageable, with consumers potentially bearing only 1/3 to 50% of the tariff costs due to businesses absorbing some of the costs [11][12]. - The decline in Q4 was attributed to technical issues from government shutdowns affecting data collection and a potential peak in tariff price impacts, with many tariff-affected goods seeing price declines [12][11]. 2026 US Inflation Risks - The inflation in 2026 is viewed as a potential economic feedback rather than a precursor to interest rate cuts, with the main risk being additional fiscal stimulus [3][4]. - Excluding tariff impacts, CPI year-on-year is slightly above 2%, indicating limited potential for core goods inflation to rise further [3][13]. - The likelihood of food and energy inflation rebounding is low, supported by measures taken by the Trump administration to lower food prices and a stable oil price environment [3][13]. - The main inflationary pressures will depend on the recovery of the job market, particularly in super core services and housing inflation [17][19]. - The most significant risk arises from potential fiscal stimulus driven by midterm election pressures, with Trump possibly proposing additional measures to gain voter support if current non-spending measures fail [4][19]. December 2025 CPI Data Commentary - The December CPI data showed a slight miss against expectations, with CPI year-on-year at 2.7% and core CPI at 2.6%, both aligning with Bloomberg's forecasts [22]. - Food prices contributed positively to CPI, while energy prices had a mixed impact, with gasoline prices declining [26][29]. - Core goods prices remained stable, with notable declines in prices for used cars and tariff-affected items like furniture and appliances [28][29].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the concept of a sugar tax as a potential policy tool in China, drawing on international experiences and historical context to advocate for its implementation to improve public health and generate revenue [2][3]. Group 1: What is Sugar Tax? - Historically, sugar tax was akin to a luxury tax, primarily targeting the wealthy to generate fiscal revenue [13]. - Contemporary sugar tax resembles tobacco tax, specifically targeting sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) to promote healthier consumption and correct market externalities, with a focus on public welfare [4][16]. Group 2: Should Sugar Tax be Implemented? - The article highlights the regressive nature of sugar tax, disproportionately affecting low-income households who consume more sugary drinks [5][26]. - It cites the U.S. experience where 99% of sugar tax revenue is allocated, with 95% used for community health investments, and 85% directed back to affected communities [5][26]. Group 3: How to Implement Sugar Tax? - The article suggests that the sugar tax should at least lead to a 20% increase in retail prices to be effective [6][31]. - It discusses various taxation methods, primarily excise tax, and emphasizes the need for a clear basis for taxation, preferably based on the sugar content of beverages [6][30]. Group 4: Revenue Potential of Sugar Tax in China - The article estimates that a sugar tax of 10% to 30% could generate approximately 700 to 2000 billion yuan annually, contributing 4% to 12% of total consumption tax revenue [8][34]. - It provides a detailed breakdown of potential revenue from both production and retail stages, indicating significant fiscal benefits from implementing such a tax [34][40].

Group 1 - The provincial two sessions are typically held before the Lunar New Year, with 17 provinces confirming meetings in January, representing 57.3% of the national GDP for 2024 [1] - Among the six major economic provinces, four will hold their sessions in January, which collectively account for 44.4% of the national GDP [1] - Zhejiang will kick off the sessions on January 14, followed by Henan, Shandong, and Guangdong on January 26, while Jiangsu is scheduled for early February [1] Group 2 - The focus of the provincial two sessions includes setting GDP targets for the next five years, with Changsha establishing a range of 5%-5.5% annual growth, down from the previous target of around 7% [2] - Historical data shows that the weighted GDP targets of the 31 provinces are consistently higher than the national target by 0.3-0.6 percentage points from 2022 to 2025 [2] - The CPI targets are generally aligned with the national target, with Wuhan maintaining a target around 2% and Changsha lowering its target from around 3% to around 2% [3] Group 3 - Employment targets are assessed by comparing the total across the 31 provinces to the previous year, with Wuhan's new employment target remaining consistent with last year [3] - The growth rate of major projects in economic provinces is a key observation point, with previous years showing limited project increases, indicating potential investment momentum issues [3] - Other areas of interest include real estate investment, service consumption statements from provinces, and local consensus on industrial policies [3]

Monetary Policy - The central bank emphasizes a flexible and efficient use of various monetary policy tools, including reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts and interest rate reductions, to maintain relatively loose social financing conditions and guide reasonable growth in financial totals and balanced credit issuance [2][13] - The focus on supporting key areas such as expanding domestic demand, technological innovation, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been reinforced [2][13] Consumption - The Ministry of Commerce highlights a shift towards prioritizing service consumption and optimizing the implementation of the old-for-new consumption policy, aiming to accelerate the cultivation of new growth points in service consumption [2][16] - The previous year's focus was on expanding the scope of the old-for-new policy and innovating diverse consumption scenarios [2][16] Real Estate - The central bank's annual meeting did not mention real estate in the context of risk prevention, focusing instead on local debt risks and risks associated with small financial institutions [3] Foreign Trade - The Ministry of Commerce emphasizes structural optimization in foreign trade, with a detailed approach to foreign-related security deployments, including promoting trade innovation and encouraging service exports [3][16] - The focus has shifted from merely stabilizing foreign trade to fostering high-quality development and expanding new foreign trade drivers [3][16] Industry - The Civil Aviation Administration and the Postal Administration both address the need to strengthen and innovate macro-control to prevent "involution" competition within industries [4] - The Ministry of Natural Resources stresses the importance of enhancing strategic mineral resource security and monitoring risks [4] Social Welfare - The National Health Commission proposes optimizing childbirth support policies and promoting integrated development of childcare services, while the Ministry of Civil Affairs emphasizes implementing comprehensive elderly care consumption subsidy projects [4] - The Ministry of Education outlines initiatives for revitalizing ordinary high schools in counties and advancing artificial intelligence education across all school levels [4] Recent Policy Developments - The Ministry of Finance announced adjustments to export tax rebate policies for photovoltaic products, with a phased reduction in VAT export rebates starting from April 2026 [5][14] - The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued implementation opinions for the "Artificial Intelligence + Manufacturing" initiative, aiming for significant advancements in AI applications within the manufacturing sector by 2027 [5][15]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the weak employment growth in the U.S. for December 2025, highlighting a significant decline in non-farm payrolls and the unexpected drop in the unemployment rate, while analyzing the contributing factors and implications for monetary policy [2][4][24]. Employment Data Summary - Non-farm payrolls for December 2025 increased by only 50,000, below the expected 70,000, with private sector jobs rising by 37,000 against an expectation of 75,000. The previous two months' data were revised downwards by a total of 76,000 [2][24]. - Employment growth was primarily concentrated in education and healthcare services (+41,000) and leisure and hospitality (+47,000), while sectors like retail, construction, and manufacturing saw job losses [2][26]. Unemployment Rate Analysis - The unemployment rate unexpectedly fell to 4.4% from a previous 4.5%, with labor force participation decreasing slightly from 62.46% to 62.40%. This decline was attributed to job growth and a slight contraction in labor supply [2][30]. - The household survey indicated an increase in total employment by 232,000, with a decrease in unemployment by 78,000, reflecting a complex labor market dynamic [30][33]. Wage and Hourly Earnings Insights - Private sector hourly wage growth met expectations, rising by 0.3% month-on-month and 3.8% year-on-year, while weekly hours worked decreased from 34.3 to 34.2, remaining at historically low levels [2][35]. - The stability in weekly earnings suggests a lack of growth despite the increase in hourly wages, indicating potential underlying weaknesses in labor demand [35]. Market Reaction and Interest Rate Expectations - Following the employment report, market expectations for interest rate cuts have cooled, with futures pricing indicating a reduction from 2.266 to 2.087 cuts expected this year, with the first anticipated in June and the second in December [3][37]. - U.S. stock markets experienced slight gains, while bond yields remained stable, reflecting a cautious optimism in response to the employment data [3][37]. Structural Factors Affecting Employment - The article identifies several structural factors contributing to weak employment growth, including federal government layoffs (approximately 28,000 jobs), tightening immigration policies (around 33,000 jobs), and potential layoffs due to AI (estimated at 6,500 jobs per month) [4][10][21]. - The remaining employment weakness, estimated at 48,000 jobs, is attributed to a general decline in labor demand, influenced by restrictive monetary policy and fiscal tightening [21][23]. Implications for Federal Reserve Policy - A monthly job growth of around 100,000 is seen as a critical threshold for assessing Federal Reserve policy direction. If job growth stabilizes at this level, it may reduce the need for further rate cuts [6][23]. - The article suggests that if employment continues to grow steadily, the Fed may pause rate cuts, while rapid recovery above 100,000 jobs could eliminate the necessity for further reductions [6][23].