文 ： 华创证券研究所副所长 、首席宏观分析师 张瑜（执业证号：S0360518090001） 联系人：殷雯卿（19945767933） 核心观点 随着大美丽法案落地，美国债务上限问题得以解决，市场开始担忧三季度美国国债供给是否会大幅增加，并重演 2023Q3 利率快速冲高的情况。从国债净发行压力 来看， Q3 国债净发行额可能需要达到 1.12 万亿美元，仅次于 2020Q2 ，规模接近 2023Q3 财政部实际融资额（ 1.01 万亿美元），供给压力确实很大。但从历史 复盘来看，一则这一次美债发行大幅增长市场已有充分预期、二则利率快速走高也需要经济增长持续超预期来推波助澜，因此 2025Q3 不一定会重演 2023Q3 的利 率快速冲高。但 2023Q3 利率冲高后倒逼美联储结束加息周期，因此如果今年 Q3 美债利率同样出现大幅抬升，或倒逼美联储加速重启其宽松周期。 报告摘要 1 、 Q3 国债净发行压力有多大？或仅次于 2020Q2 国债净发行额≈财政赤字 +TGA 余额变动（财政部期末现金余额目标 - 期初现金余额）。 基于这一公式，根据 CBO 预测值， 2025Q3 财政赤字 =0.6 万亿美元， ...

Core Viewpoint - The cross-border capital flow pattern in Q1 2025 is similar to that of Q4 2023 to Q3 2024, with foreign capital continuing to net inflow while domestic capital experiences a net outflow, reaching the highest level since Q1 2021 [2][4] Group 1: Cross-Border Capital Flow Overview - In Q1 2025, cross-border capital continued to net outflow, amounting to $316.7 billion, with domestic capital outflow reaching $481.1 billion, the highest since Q1 2021 [4][11] - The main drivers of the domestic capital outflow include domestic investors purchasing overseas stocks and investment funds through channels like "Hong Kong Stock Connect," leading to a securities investment outflow of $164.5 billion [4][11] - Domestic direct investment outflow was $143.6 billion, reflecting a proactive "going out" strategy by Chinese enterprises [4][11] Group 2: Domestic Securities Investment - The outflow of domestic securities investment in Q1 2025 reached a historical record since 2011, totaling $164.5 billion, while foreign securities investment saw a net inflow of $121.8 billion [5][13] - The outflow included $125.1 billion from equity investments and $39.4 billion from bond investments, with the main channels being "Hong Kong Stock Connect" and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) programs [5][13][14] - Foreign equity investment shifted from a net outflow of $85.7 billion in Q4 2024 to a significant net inflow of $121.8 billion in Q1 2025, driven by positive market expectations for Chinese technology stocks [5][14] Group 3: Domestic Direct Investment - Domestic direct investment outflow reached $143.6 billion in Q1 2025, the highest since Q1 2021, with total direct investment net outflow at $110.3 billion [6][18] - The increase in domestic direct investment outflow is attributed to the restructuring of global supply chains and the deep integration of the Chinese market with global markets [6][18] Group 4: Trade Credit - Trade credit net outflow in Q1 2025 reached $44.2 billion, the highest since Q4 2015, with domestic trade credit outflow of $18.3 billion [7][23] - The outflow was influenced by market expectations of RMB appreciation and changes in import and export settlement rates [7][23] Group 5: Monetary Gold Growth - Monetary gold increased by $38.3 billion in Q1 2025, marking a record since 2011, with the central bank accumulating a total of 11.26 million ounces of gold since November 2022 [8][29] - This increase is part of the fifth round of gold accumulation by the central bank since 2000, reflecting a strategic move in response to global economic conditions [8][29] Group 6: Capital Flow Breakdown - In Q1 2025, total capital outflow was $512.1 billion, a 58.8% increase from the previous quarter, primarily driven by increased overseas investments by domestic investors [42][43] - The capital outflow was significantly influenced by a $30.5 billion increase in overseas investments and a $78.3 billion increase in reserve assets [42][43] Group 7: Capital Inflow Breakdown - Total capital inflow in Q1 2025 was $195.4 billion, with foreign investors contributing $153.5 billion through domestic asset investments [45][46] - The inflow was supported by a $12.1 billion increase in direct investments and a $121.8 billion increase in securities investments [45][46]

Core Viewpoint - The report emphasizes that "quantity" is more important than "price" this year, focusing on the impact of inflation risks on the U.S. economy and its implications for exports and employment [2][11]. Group 1: Impact of Inflation on U.S. Economy - Inflation may erode the real income and consumption capacity of U.S. consumers, particularly among low- and middle-income groups, negatively affecting their purchasing power and increasing wealth disparity [3][12]. - A significant rise in inflation could suppress risk appetite, leading to a decline in U.S. stock markets, which would adversely affect the wealth effect for high-income groups and consequently impact service consumption [3][18]. - Rising inflation, combined with tax cuts, may raise concerns about the sustainability of U.S. public debt, potentially keeping long-term U.S. Treasury yields high and constraining fiscal expansion [4][26][27]. - If inflation rises significantly, it could limit the Federal Reserve's ability to cut interest rates, reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy in countering potential economic and employment downturns [4][32]. Group 2: Observing Short-term Inflation Risks - Various dimensions indicate short-term inflationary pressures, particularly in price expectations and surveys, while actual prices and economic indicators suggest a more stable inflation trajectory [5][35]. - Consumer inflation expectations tend to synchronize with U.S. CPI year-on-year changes but may lead actual inflation trends by 1-2 quarters during significant inflationary periods [5][36]. - Price surveys from businesses generally lead U.S. CPI changes by 2-5 months, indicating potential inflation trends [5][37]. - Financial market indicators, such as implied inflation rates from U.S. Treasury bonds, also lead CPI changes by about 2 months [5][46]. Group 3: Constructing a Leading Index for U.S. Inflation - A comprehensive leading index for U.S. inflation has been constructed using various dimensions, showing a correlation with U.S. CPI changes, leading by approximately 2 months [8][61]. - The leading index indicates that inflationary pressures are primarily driven by cost factors, with other dimensions showing limited upward pressure [8][68]. - The recent rise in the comprehensive leading index suggests a potential increase in U.S. CPI, with predictions indicating a possible rise to around 3.2% in July [8][69].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the impact of tariffs on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the United States, highlighting how tariff increases have contributed to inflationary pressures in recent months [2][3][4]. Group 1: Tariff Impact on CPI - The inflation effect of tariffs is evident in the June data, with notable increases in prices for furniture (1%), clothing (0.4%), and entertainment goods (0.8%) [3][8]. - It is estimated that tariffs have already been reflected in the CPI, with a potential impact of 14% if core goods prices remained at February levels, or 40% if they followed last year's declining trend [4][14]. - The overall effective tariff rate in the U.S. increased by approximately 8.3 percentage points from March to June, with the latest estimate suggesting it could rise to 17.3% [10][19]. Group 2: Remaining Tariff Effects - If the overall tariff rate reaches 17.3%, the remaining unreflected tariff impact on core goods prices could contribute an additional 0.5 to 0.54 percentage points to the overall CPI [19]. - Projections indicate that if the remaining tariff effects are realized gradually over the next three months, the CPI year-on-year could be 3.2% and 3.3% for the third and fourth quarters, respectively [19][29]. Group 3: June CPI Data Analysis - The June CPI rose to 2.7% year-on-year, slightly below expectations, while the core CPI increased to 2.9% [20][29]. - The breadth of CPI inflation has widened, with the proportion of items with year-on-year increases exceeding 2% rising from 40.8% to 44.1% [20][24]. - Core goods prices saw a significant increase, with the CPI for core goods rising from 0% to 0.2% month-on-month, driven by higher prices in imported goods [24][26]. Group 4: Market Reaction - Following the CPI report, market expectations for interest rate cuts have slightly cooled, with the anticipated number of cuts decreasing from 1.93 to 1.76 [29]. - The U.S. dollar index rose by 0.53% to 98.63, and the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds increased by 4.8 basis points to 4.481% [29].

Core Viewpoint - The document emphasizes that the research material is intended solely for professional investors associated with Huachuang Securities, highlighting the importance of appropriate investor suitability management [1][3]. Group 1 - The research team at Huachuang Securities is positioned to provide timely exchanges of viewpoints specifically for professional investors in the context of new media [3]. - The material is derived from previously published research reports by Huachuang Securities, and any discrepancies should refer back to the complete content of the original reports [4]. - The opinions and analyses presented may change without notice based on subsequent reports from Huachuang Securities, indicating a dynamic approach to investment research [4].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the understanding of Supply-Side Reform 3.0, emphasizing its integration with domestic demand expansion and the differences from previous reforms in 2015 and 2016 [2][3][5]. Top-Level Design - The core deployment of the current economic strategy is to combine the implementation of the domestic demand expansion strategy with deepening supply-side structural reforms [3]. - A new framework called "BBT" has been introduced, focusing on three aspects: supplementing shortages, transformation, and improvement [3][4]. - Industries are categorized based on supply-demand matching: supplementing shortages, improving efficiency, and transformation for future needs [4]. Historical Comparison - The external environment differs significantly from 2015-2016, with higher contributions from exports and greater external pressures [6]. - The current reform focuses on midstream manufacturing with a more complex range of industries compared to the previous focus on state-owned enterprises and fewer product categories [6]. - The goals of the current reform emphasize long-term industrial upgrading rather than immediate economic recovery [6]. - The methods of implementation have shifted from administrative to market-oriented and legal frameworks, which may result in slower effects [7]. - The duration of the current reform is expected to be longer, potentially lasting 1-3 years, as it relies on market and institutional changes [7]. Three Stages of Reform - The current supply-side reform may progress through three stages: controlling new projects, promoting industry mergers and restructuring, and potentially implementing mandatory capacity reduction measures if necessary [9]. - The process is not urgent and will adapt to the specific conditions of different industries, with some like the photovoltaic sector possibly moving faster [9]. Historical Review of Previous Reforms - The article identifies five similarities between the supply-side reforms of 1998 and 2015, including similar reform backgrounds and common industry focus [11][12]. - The approach to reform has been consistent, involving setting targets, monitoring progress, strict enforcement, and maintaining employment [13][14]. - The effectiveness of past reforms shows long-term improvements in industry profitability, although short-term impacts varied [16]. Current Assessment of Supply-Side Pressure - A quantitative assessment of supply-side pressures indicates that the current industrial pressure index has not yet reached the levels seen in 2015, suggesting a slower approach to capacity reduction [18]. - The photovoltaic industry currently exhibits the highest pressure index, indicating it may be prioritized in the reform process [18].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the economic performance in the second quarter, highlighting the need for a rebalancing of quantity and price in GDP growth, with a focus on consumer spending and investment control measures [1][5]. Group 1: Economic Growth Analysis - In Q2, GDP growth was 5.2%, slightly down from 5.4% in Q1, while the cumulative growth for the first half of the year was 5.3% [3][19]. - The nominal GDP growth rate for Q2 was 3.9%, with a significant contribution from quantity at 132% and a negative contribution from price at -30.6% [3][19]. - The contribution rates to GDP growth were as follows: final consumption expenditure at 52.3%, capital formation at 24.7%, and net exports at 23% [22]. Group 2: Investment and Consumption Trends - Fixed asset investment growth in June was -0.1%, with manufacturing and infrastructure investment showing declines [4][51]. - Consumer spending in June grew by 4.8%, down from 6.4% in May, with notable declines in restaurant and online shopping growth rates [4][40]. - The average monthly income for migrant workers in Q2 increased by 3.0%, but this was lower than the 3.3% growth in Q1 [31]. Group 3: Rebalancing Measures - The article outlines three key measures for addressing the imbalance between quantity and price: controlling incremental investments, improving corporate cash flow, and enhancing consumer spending willingness [5][12][18]. - The first measure involves strict control over new investments, particularly in the manufacturing sector, where investment growth has been declining [12][13]. - The second measure focuses on improving cash flow for enterprises, with recent data indicating a recovery in corporate deposits [15][6]. - The third measure aims to boost consumer spending through various policies, with consumer inclination slightly increasing to 68.6% in Q2 compared to 68.5% in the previous year [18][25].

Core Viewpoints - The current liquidity easing is primarily driven by the relocation of household deposits, leading to a market logic that favors equities over bonds, rather than a simultaneous bull market in both [3][5][6] - Unlike previous instances where household deposit relocation occurred after economic expectations improved, this time it is policy-driven, with the underlying fundamentals still in a bottoming phase, resulting in strong market expectations for further central bank easing [3][6][19] - Continuous relocation of household deposits may raise concerns for the central bank regarding idle funds, and the necessity for further loans to stimulate investment is decreasing, unless specific adverse economic events occur [3][7][19] Financial Data Summary - In June 2025, new social financing increased by 4.20 trillion yuan, up from 2.29 trillion yuan previously, with a year-on-year growth of 8.9% [2][25] - M2 money supply grew by 8.3% year-on-year, while new M1 increased by 4.6%, indicating a shift in liquidity dynamics [2][28] - The increase in corporate loans was significant, with a total of 2.24 trillion yuan in new loans, reflecting a strong demand for credit [21][27] Analysis of Liquidity Dynamics - When household deposit relocation is the main driver of liquidity, the market logic tends to favor equities, creating a seesaw effect between stocks and bonds [5][12] - The current environment suggests a preference for equities over bonds, as household deposit relocation is not linked to improved economic expectations but rather to policy initiatives [6][15] - The central bank's future actions may focus more on structural adjustments rather than broad monetary easing, aiming to stabilize liquidity in both equity and bond markets [9][19]

文 ： 华创证券研究所副所长 、首席宏观分析师 张瑜（执业证号：S0360518090001） 联系人：夏雪（微信 SuperSummerSnow） 事项 6 月我国以美元计算出口同比 5.8% ，彭博一致预期 5% ，前值 4.80% ；以美元计算进口同比 1.1% ，彭博一致预期 1.3% ，前值 -3.40% 。 核心观点 2 、后续出口怎么看？ 对于 7 月出口，从高频跟踪指标来看，或仍具韧性，增速可能边际放缓。区域结构上，美国的拖累或再度加剧，而东盟出口或仍保持较高景 气。再往后看，出口下行风险或在积聚 。 报告摘要 一、关税影响中国出口价格了吗？ 近期市场关注到日本汽车出口价格大幅下跌， 6 月乘用车出口价格指数相比 3 月跌 7.3% ，引发市场思考出口商是否在关税压力下主动降价出口美国，本文聚焦近 期中国的出口价格变化，主要关注四个问题： 1 ）整体来看，关税压力下中国出口价格下滑了吗？ 2 ）美国进口视角来看，从中国进口价格是否有明显下滑？ 3 ） 分行业来看，关税压力越大的行业中国出口降价越多吗？ 4 ）后续出口价格变化如何跟踪？ （一）整体来看：中国出口价格降幅在收窄 中国出口价格指数同 ...

Core Viewpoint - The recent Central Urban Work Conference marks a significant moment in China's urbanization strategy, reflecting both continuity and change compared to the 2015 conference, particularly in urbanization rates and real estate policies [1][4][5]. Comparison with 2015: Two Constants - High-level attendance remains consistent, with all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee present, indicating the central government's strong coordination on urban issues [3][12]. - The timing of the conference aligns with the initiation of new five-year plans for both national and urbanization strategies, serving as a critical starting point for future urban development [4][14]. Comparison with 2015: Four Changes - **Shift in Urbanization Assessment**: The assessment of urbanization has shifted from rapid growth to stable development, with the current urbanization rate at 67% and a target of nearly 70% by 2029, suggesting a potential slowdown in growth as per international trends [5][20]. - **Focus on High-Quality Urban Renewal**: The emphasis has shifted to "high-quality urban renewal" rather than the aggressive "shelter improvement" plans of 2015, indicating a long-term approach to urban development with a focus on existing infrastructure rather than expansion [6][17]. - **Increased Attention to Urban Safety**: The conference introduced a new focus on urban safety, emphasizing the need to maintain safety standards and enhance urban resilience through infrastructure improvements and social stability measures [7][23]. - **Identification of New Industrial Opportunities**: The conference highlighted new opportunities in urban renewal, service industries, and pollution reduction initiatives, indicating a shift towards sustainable urban development practices [8][25][26]. Future Tracking - Key follow-up actions include monitoring the implementation documents that will detail the conference's resolutions, tracking high-level government activities related to urbanization, and observing how urban issues are integrated into subsequent central meetings and documents [9][27].