Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the phenomenon of improving GDP growth alongside weak inflation, attributing this to financial cycle adjustments and restrained policy measures, leading to a widening demand gap that suppresses inflation growth [1][2][3]. Economic Performance - Over the past two quarters, GDP year-on-year growth has reached 5.4%, while inflation remains weak, with CPI growth close to zero due to the drag from food prices, particularly pork [2][12]. - The core CPI inflation is lower than previous predictions, indicating a persistent divergence between economic growth and inflation [2][12]. Labor Market Dynamics - Economic structure optimization and technological advancements have led to a decrease in labor intensity, with labor demand slowing down. By 2024, labor intensity in China's secondary and tertiary industries is expected to be around 70-80 compared to 2018 levels [3][29]. - The overall unemployment rate remains stable, but income growth has slowed, indicating a shift towards a "quasi-equilibrium" state in the labor market [3][51]. Future Economic Outlook - The "quasi-equilibrium" growth is expected to continue in the second half of the year, with GDP year-on-year growth projected at approximately 5.0% for the year [4][56]. - CPI inflation is anticipated to remain low, with core inflation showing slight improvement but still expected to be in a negative range for the year [4][60]. Structural Changes - The financial cycle is transitioning, with a gradual reduction in the negative impact of real estate on the economy. The contribution of real estate to GDP growth turned negative in the second half of 2021, but this drag is diminishing [8][12]. - The shift towards new economic models, including high-end manufacturing, is increasing production efficiency and altering the labor market dynamics [16][22]. Consumption and Investment Trends - Consumer spending is expected to stabilize, with the "old-for-new" policy contributing to retail sales growth, although its impact may weaken in the fourth quarter due to base effects [45][54]. - Fixed asset investment is projected to grow by around 4.0% for the year, with manufacturing investment expected to increase by 8.0% [55][56]. Trade and Export Dynamics - Exports are facing challenges from tariffs but are expected to show resilience, with a projected year-on-year growth of around 4.0% [56][57]. - The import growth is anticipated to be structurally weak, with a potential year-on-year growth close to zero [56][57].

Group 1 - The performance of the Hong Kong stock market in the first half of 2025 was notable, significantly outperforming A-shares and showing resilience despite the impact of "reciprocal tariffs" [1][10] - The market has faced challenges, including pulse-like rebounds and a concentration of performance in a few sectors, with only 35% of stocks outperforming the index since the beginning of the year [1][13] - The outlook for the second half of 2025 is uncertain, with the potential for the market to maintain resilience amidst tariff uncertainties and prevailing sentiments [1][14] Group 2 - The core issue facing the Chinese economy is the ongoing credit contraction in the private sector, driven by a mismatch between return expectations and costs, rather than a lack of liquidity or low interest rates [2][16] - As of April, China's M2 reached 325 trillion RMB, 2.4 times GDP, and household savings hit a record high of 145 trillion RMB, indicating ample liquidity [2][16] - The actual interest rate remains high relative to the natural rate, creating a situation where return expectations for residents and enterprises are lower than their financing costs [2][17] Group 3 - Solutions to the credit contraction include increasing return expectations and lowering financing costs, with a focus on external interventions such as fiscal policies or new growth points like AI technology [3][22] - The current credit cycle is not in a phase of significant deleveraging but is also not ready for substantial expansion, suggesting a period of stagnation in the second half of 2025 [4][27] - Key factors influencing the credit cycle include tariffs, fiscal policy, and AI developments, with the relative changes in these areas being crucial for future market direction [4][27] Group 4 - The market is characterized by excess liquidity and limited returns, leading to overall index fluctuations and structural opportunities [5][41] - Investors are seeking either stable returns or growth returns, with sectors like new consumption and technology showing significant improvements in return on equity (ROE) [6][42] - Historical patterns indicate that the current market conditions resemble previous periods of wide index fluctuations, providing opportunities for sector-focused investments [7][41] Group 5 - The outlook for corporate earnings in 2025 suggests a slight growth of 2% under a 30% tariff scenario, with overall earnings growth expected to be limited [8][45] - Valuation levels are constrained, with high dividend yields of 5-6% and a crowded new economy sector, indicating limited room for overall market recovery [8][48] - The inflow of southbound funds remains a significant driver for the Hong Kong market, with an estimated inflow of 200-300 billion HKD expected this year [9][9]

Group 1 - The article discusses the impact of "reciprocal tariffs" on global markets, leading to a growing consensus on "de-dollarization" and the potential for U.S. assets to outperform in the second half of 2025 [1][17][20] - The relative strength of the credit cycles in the U.S. and China is highlighted, indicating a shift from expansion to contraction, and then to rebalancing in the second half of 2025 [2][22][24] - Key factors influencing the credit cycles include tariffs, fiscal policy, and AI, which are essential for analyzing the economic outlook for both countries [3][18][19] Group 2 - In the U.S., the credit cycle may restart, but the third quarter is expected to remain chaotic, providing buying opportunities amid volatility [3][4][5] - The article notes that the U.S. economy has a solid foundation, with inflation pressures potentially easing, allowing for interest rate cuts in the fourth quarter [5][6][30] - Tax cuts are expected to support consumer spending and stimulate corporate investment, with the potential for a significant increase in capital expenditures [6][35][37] Group 3 - In contrast, China's credit cycle is still in a contraction phase, primarily due to high costs exceeding return expectations, which limits the willingness of the private sector to leverage [8][10] - The article emphasizes the need for fiscal stimulus and emerging growth points to improve return expectations in China, as current fiscal policies are seen as insufficient [9][10][12] - The potential for structural opportunities in the Chinese market is noted, with a focus on quality assets amid limited overall market direction [10][11][12] Group 4 - The article suggests that the U.S. market may not be as pessimistic as anticipated, with opportunities in U.S. assets, particularly in bonds and equities, as the market adjusts to tariff impacts [11][12][30] - For China, the focus remains on structural opportunities, with Hong Kong stocks expected to outperform A-shares, while caution is advised against excessive speculation [11][12][15] - The overall investment strategy should consider the potential for volatility in the third quarter, with a focus on quality assets and structural growth [10][11][12]

Core Viewpoint - The current international monetary system is undergoing profound changes due to the long-term disorderly expansion of U.S. public debt, the "weaponization" of the dollar during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and various policy proposals during the Trump 2.0 era, which erode the credibility of the dollar as the world's reserve currency [2]. Group 1: Triffin Dilemma Misinterpretations - The "Triffin Dilemma" has evolved into two versions post-Bretton Woods: one concerning the current account and the other regarding "safe assets," both of which contain significant misunderstandings [4][13]. - Misconceptions include confusing net capital with total capital inflows, mixing "earned" and "borrowed" foreign exchange reserves, and conflating bilateral with multilateral capital flows [17][19][20]. - The supply of dollar liquidity is not necessarily linked to the U.S. current account deficit, as the U.S. maintained a current account surplus for about 30 years after becoming the primary reserve currency [14][21]. Group 2: U.S. Stocks as Safe Assets - Overseas funds have shifted from U.S. Treasury bonds to U.S. stocks, leading to the disappearance of the equity risk premium in the S&P 500, indicating that investors now view U.S. stocks as safe assets [5][23]. - This shift is driven by declining safety perceptions of U.S. debt and the stable long-term growth of U.S. stocks, with significant capital inflows into the U.S. stock market [26][30]. Group 3: U.S. Reserve Currency Status - The U.S. is unlikely to relinquish its status as the world's reserve currency due to the substantial benefits it provides, including the international seigniorage revenue [6][32]. - The unique asset-liability structure of the U.S. allows it to benefit from dollar depreciation, effectively transferring payment burdens globally [36][39]. Group 4: Declining Economic Share vs. Rising Financial Dominance - While the U.S. share of the real economy is declining, its share in international finance is increasing, primarily due to the offshore dollar being the most important financing currency and onshore dollars being viewed as safe assets [7][40][44]. - The expansion of cross-border capital flows has outpaced trade growth, reinforcing the dollar's financial position [46]. Group 5: Dollar Cycles - The dollar exhibits cyclical characteristics influenced by fundamentals, policies, and capital flows, with positive feedback mechanisms amplifying these cycles [8][48][52]. - The dollar's appreciation impacts global economies asymmetrically, benefiting the U.S. while constraining other economies [53]. Group 6: The Dollar's Global Impact - The U.S. often emerges unscathed from global crises, with the adverse effects disproportionately affecting non-U.S. economies due to the asymmetrical impact of U.S. monetary policy [56][58]. - The dollar's status as a reserve currency provides the U.S. with unique advantages, including lower financing costs and the ability to conduct fiscal stimulus without immediate repayment pressures [57]. Group 7: Need for an International Monetary System - The current trend towards a multi-polar world raises questions about the necessity of an international monetary system, with the dollar still playing a central role in global trade and finance [62][63]. - A multi-currency system may be preferable to a non-system, as it allows for currency competition and provides space for emerging currencies like the renminbi [64]. Group 8: Transitioning to a Multi-Currency System - Transitioning from a dollar-centric system to a multi-currency system requires policy coordination among major currency issuers and flexible exchange rate arrangements [11][65].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the significant impact of the Trump administration's tariff policies on the U.S. economy, highlighting the multifaceted use of tariffs as a tool to address various domestic economic and social issues, including trade deficits, social inequality, national security, government debt, illegal immigration, and drug abuse [2][20]. Tariff Policy and Economic Impact - The effective tariff rate in the U.S. rose to 28.4% before decreasing to 15.5% after progress in U.S.-China talks, still significantly higher than 2.4% in 2024, marking the highest level in nearly a century [6][11]. - Tariffs are viewed as a negative supply shock with "stagflation" effects, potentially leading to inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy, although the current inflation is expected to be more structural and one-time rather than indicative of overheating [3][27]. - The uncertainty surrounding tariff policies is causing businesses to delay investments and reduce hiring, contributing to downward pressure on economic activity [3][33]. Currency Valuation - The tariffs have unexpectedly led to a depreciation of the U.S. dollar, as investors perceive the high tariffs to be more harmful to the U.S. economy than to other countries, prompting a shift away from dollar assets [3][38]. - Concerns about potential strategies to devalue the dollar, similar to historical events like the Smith Agreement and Plaza Accord, are present, but the article suggests that active devaluation is not the baseline scenario [3][40]. Fiscal Policy and Tariffs - Tariffs function as a form of tax that can be passed on to consumers, acting as a "hidden consumption tax," which may help alleviate some deficit pressures but raises concerns about the high levels of government debt [4][45]. - The "One Big Beautiful Bill" proposed by the House aims to make tax cuts permanent while also cutting welfare spending, reflecting a functional fiscal approach that may limit inflationary pressures [4][49]. Economic Forecast - The U.S. economy is expected to experience "slowing growth and phase-in inflation" in the second half of 2025, with core CPI inflation projected to rise from 2.9% in Q2 to 3.5% in Q4 [6][58]. - Real GDP growth for 2025 is forecasted to decline to 2.0%, with further slowing in domestic demand indicators [6][58]. - The Federal Reserve is anticipated to delay interest rate cuts until Q4 2025, with a potential reduction of 25 basis points [6][59]. Trade Negotiations and Future Tariff Policies - Future tariff negotiations may focus on expanding U.S. exports and reducing trade barriers from other countries, with a possibility of maintaining a 10% base tariff as a revenue-generating measure [20][21]. - Tariffs related to illegal immigration and fentanyl may be lifted if substantial progress is made by other countries in addressing these issues [22][23]. - The article emphasizes that Trump's tariff policies reflect a broader trend of re-evaluating globalization and are likely to become institutionalized as part of his administration's strategy [23].

Core Viewpoint - The article suggests that the A-share market has likely reached a significant bottom, with structural opportunities emerging in growth, consumption, cyclical sectors, and dividends. The market is expected to experience high-frequency fluctuations within a narrow range, with a potential upward trend in the second half of the year, contingent on macroeconomic policies and external uncertainties [2][3][4]. Economic Recovery and Internal Dynamics - The internal momentum of China's economy is gradually recovering, supported by a package of stable growth policies. However, challenges remain, particularly in the real estate sector and weak consumer demand. The manufacturing sector's resilience is crucial for economic growth, but uncertainties regarding tariffs may dampen future export performance [3][6][7]. - The real estate market's stabilization is critical for macroeconomic health, with recent data indicating a narrowing decline in sales area but a widening decline in sales value. The sector's recovery will depend on effective policy responses [7][8]. Valuation Perspectives and Investor Dynamics - Despite a projected 3% decline in A-share earnings for 2024, dividend payouts are expected to increase by 5%, driven by improved free cash flow. The current dividend yield of the CSI 300 index is approximately 3.5%, significantly higher than the 10-year government bond yield, indicating a favorable valuation environment [4][5]. - The structure of investors in the A-share market is shifting, with individual investors gradually increasing their market presence, influencing market dynamics and styles [4]. Investment Strategy and Sector Focus - In an uncertain environment, the investment strategy should focus on certainty, prioritizing stable sectors before shifting to growth opportunities. Key investment themes include: 1. Opportunities in sectors that can clear supply and expand capacity, such as industrial metals and lithium batteries [5][23]. 2. High-growth opportunities less correlated with economic cycles, particularly in the AI industry and defense sectors [5][24]. 3. Dividend-paying sectors with strong cash flow and low volatility, including consumer staples and utilities [5][25]. Capital Market and Policy Environment - The capital market is undergoing steady institutional improvements, with new regulations supporting market stability and growth. The focus is on enhancing the development of technology-driven enterprises and promoting mergers and acquisitions [10][11]. - Fiscal policy is expected to play a crucial role in supporting economic recovery, with a projected increase in the deficit rate and government bond issuance for 2025, indicating a proactive approach to stimulate growth [9][10]. Profitability and Earnings Outlook - A-share profitability is anticipated to stabilize and improve, with projected earnings growth of approximately 3.5% for 2025. The non-financial sector is expected to see a more significant recovery, with earnings growth around 8.3% [21][22]. - The structural optimization of A-share earnings is evident, with a declining share of profits from real estate and construction, while the technology sector's contribution is increasing, highlighting a shift towards more sustainable growth drivers [25].

点击小程序查看报告原文 Abstract 摘要 关税冲击风险偏好，外部突变因素驱动商品价格共振 关税冲击风险偏好，外部突变因素驱动商品价格共振 上半年，大宗商品市场频繁发生同涨同跌的共振行情，背后驱动却并非基本面的内生同频，而更多源于意外变量的外部冲击。我们认为美国关税政策反复 是商品市场共同面对的核心变数，从贸易政策不确定性驱动跨市套利交易、提振海外金属价格，到"对等关税"超预期、商品市场迎来抛售。市场资金的剧 烈流动中或已显示，本次美国关税政策对商品市场风险偏好的冲击并不亚于2020年全球疫情和2022年俄乌冲突时期，我们认为一致预期的演绎和定价可能 已经较为充分。继特朗普政府在4月23日传递关税政策缓和信号[1]，再到5月12日中美日内瓦经贸会谈联合声明发布[2]，关税不确定性似乎初步见顶，全 球经济衰退担忧缓和，商品价格和市场持仓的回补或均显示一致预期的修正进程已经开始。 一致预期后的变局可 能来自 于商品基本面的易变因素 展望下半年，贸易政策和地缘局势对商品市场的影响或将从预期到现实，而这本身也是不确定性从检验到修正的过程，不同商品基本面所面临的易变因素 可能带来预期差机会，成为一致预期后的市场变局 ...

Core Viewpoint - The real estate market is expected to stabilize gradually, with the process divided into three key phases, requiring patience from stakeholders [2][4]. Group 1: Market Confidence and Sales Performance - The Politburo meeting on September 26 established confidence in stabilizing the real estate market, leading to significant improvements in market sentiment from Q4 2024 to Q1 2025, with total annual sales of new and second-hand homes increasing by 120 million square meters [2][6]. - However, in Q2 2025, both sales volume and prices showed signs of weakening, indicating potential market volatility [2][10]. - The overall sales area of new homes has declined by approximately 55% from historical peaks, while second-hand home sales have decreased by about 6% [6]. Group 2: Policy Framework and Implementation - The current real estate policy framework consists of three main categories: 1. Policies aimed at adjusting supply-demand structures and restoring price expectations to achieve the first two phases of stabilization [3][20]. 2. Measures to mitigate and address risks arising from the downward cycle of real estate, preventing non-linear impacts on the macroeconomy [3][20]. 3. Long-term institutional policies aimed at correcting and preventing issues exposed during the current cycle [3][20]. - The first category includes adjustments to interest rates and purchase restrictions, as well as urban village renovations and the acquisition of existing land and housing [21][22]. Group 3: Short-term and Long-term Outlook - In the short term, the industry is expected to continue its bottoming phase, but there is considerable potential for recovery in the medium to long term [4][41]. - The anticipated scenario for 2025 is a "medium policy" situation, where total sales performance may slightly exceed expectations due to the prolonged effects of the September 26 policy [4][41]. - The recovery of total housing sales to historically reasonable levels is expected to create significant upward potential, particularly as the balance of new and second-hand homes improves [4][41]. Group 4: Risk Management and Structural Adjustments - The real estate sector faces risks related to high leverage among developers, which has led to liquidity crises and issues such as the "guarantee delivery" problem [31][32]. - Effective management of credit risks in real estate companies is crucial to avoid negative impacts on market sentiment and financial stability [32][34]. - The government is encouraged to adopt a more proactive approach in supporting systemically important real estate companies while balancing moral hazard and fairness in the restructuring process [33][34].

中金研究 近期市场对美元走势的关注度大幅上升，不仅关心其短期走势，也关注其长期地位。 美元成为国际储备货币 是市场选择，也是制度安排。一个货币如何成为国际货币 ，学 术领域有经济与非经济视角，Barry Eichengreen等（2019）形象地将之比喻为"水星假说"与"火星假说"。所谓的"水星假说"，强调经济因素（比如 经济规模、资本市场发达程度等）决定某货币是否能成为国际货币；所谓的"火星假说"，强调地缘政治等非经 济因素的作用。 一些人士也指出（如法国财政部长德斯坦），美元受益于其国际储备货币地位，享有低融资成本等"特权"。在 不考虑其他因素的情况下，美国债务与其他国家的债务相比，能享受更低的利率。不管是"火星假说"视角还 是"水星假说"视角，美元的国际地位面临的挑战在增多。从"水星假说"视角来看，我们认为美国财政赤字居高 不下，债务风险增加，美元的信用受到质疑。从"火星假说"视角来看，美国为其盟友提供安全保障的意愿与能 力下降，我们认为降低了美元的"安全溢价"。但是在中短期内，我们认为美元在全球储备中仍占据很重要的地 位。 点击小程序查看报告原文 美元成为国际储备货币是市场选择，也是制度安排 不同的货 ...

Strategy - The article discusses the accelerating trend of A to H listings in the Hong Kong stock market, with nearly 50 A-share companies planning to list in Hong Kong, of which 23 have submitted materials or have been approved [3][4] - The recent H-share listing of CATL has intensified this trend, achieving the highest IPO financing globally for the year and leading to a rare situation where H-shares are more expensive than A-shares [3][4] - Key questions addressed include the reasons behind the increasing A to H listings, the premium of H-shares over A-shares, and the implications for the Hong Kong market in both the short and long term [3] Macroeconomy - The article highlights three confusions regarding the RMB exchange rate, noting the recent appreciation of the RMB against the USD despite advancements in China's manufacturing technology and efficiency [7] - It points out the historical high gap between the nominal effective exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate of the RMB, as well as the unprecedented divergence between the nominal effective exchange rate and the USD exchange rate in recent years [7] - The article suggests that the RMB may have short-term appreciation potential against the USD due to unfulfilled depreciation pressures on the USD and the accumulation of funds awaiting settlement from China's current account [7]