1. Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the content 2. Core Views of the Report - In 2026, the global macro - economy is expected to maintain resilience, supporting risk sentiment. The macro - economic mainline will shift from trade policies and geopolitical relations to economic fundamentals, and major economies will be in a period of relatively abundant macro - liquidity mainly driven by fiscal expansion [2][49]. - The global economy, led by the US, will maintain resilience in 2026, continuing to support the performance of risk assets. The structure may be more balanced than in 2025, with the technology sector, industry prosperity logic, and macro - cycle opportunities intertwined [3][50]. - The long - term US Treasury bond yield has limited trends in 2026, with an upward - risk bias. The US dollar index is expected to maintain a wide - range oscillation throughout the year, with an upward - risk bias [3][163][172]. 3. Summary According to the Directory 3.1 2025 Overseas Macroeconomic Mainline Logic and Performance Review of Major Asset Classes - **Economic fundamentals**: In 2025, the US economy maintained a relatively high growth rate, but the actual GDP growth rate declined marginally compared to 2024. Non - US economies were stronger in the first half of the year, and the US economy was stronger in the second half. The inventory and net exports of the US GDP fluctuated greatly in the first half due to trade policies, and personal consumption and private fixed investment showed certain resilience. The US industrial output increased, and there were signs of an early - cycle expansion. Monetary policy continued to cut interest rates, and the yield of US Treasury bonds declined, but the stock - market valuation remained basically unchanged. The fiscal deficit ratio decreased [7][8][16][17][26]. - **Adapting to the new reality of the tariff era**: In 2025, tariff policies were the most important macro - risks. The overall US tariff rate remained high, and the "severe decoupling" between China and the US turned into "slow decoupling." The "tariff - inflation" transmission was relatively mild, and the US inflation expectation became stable and desensitized to tariff uncertainties [30][37][39]. - **Performance review of major asset classes**: In 2025, the global market had a good year. Global equity markets rose significantly, with the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index and the STAR 50 Index leading the way. The bond market also had positive returns, and the commodity market was highly differentiated [47][48]. 3.2 2026 Overseas Macroeconomic Outlook 3.2.1 "From Politics to Economy", "From International to Domestic" - The mainline of the global macro - economy will shift from trade policies and geopolitical relations to economic fundamentals, and the focus of geopolitics will shift from international to domestic. The US mid - term elections, China's 14th Five - Year Plan, the eurozone's fiscal expansion, and Japan's new policies will all focus on domestic economic and political issues [55]. - **Tariff policy changes**: The "general tariff" under the IEEPA framework is facing challenges. If the government loses the lawsuit, the IEEPA tariff will be revoked. Relevant industry tariffs may become an important legal tool for rebuilding the high - tariff system, and attention should be paid to changes in key industries and commodity trade flows [56][58]. - **US National Security Strategy**: The US National Security Strategy focuses on economic and financial security, including trade balance, ensuring key supply chains, re - industrialization, energy dominance, revitalizing the US dollar, and tax cuts and deregulation. It shows a shift from maintaining global leadership to focusing on national interests [61]. 3.2.2 Macro - liquidity - **Monetary policy**: The Fed is expected to cut interest rates to 3.25% in 2026, with two 50bp cuts in total. There is a risk that the final interest - rate cut space is less than expected, and there is a probability of an early end to the interest - rate cut cycle or a start of an interest - rate hike cycle. The Fed is expected to restart balance - sheet expansion in the second half of 2026 [65][67][68]. - **Fiscal policy**: The US fiscal policy will expand marginally in 2026. The "Great Beauty Act" will have a positive impact on the economy, and the fiscal deficit ratio is expected to expand moderately. The risk of concerns about the sustainability of US Treasury bonds is relatively controllable [78][79][80]. - **Macro - liquidity**: The US financial conditions index is expected to continue to expand in 2026, mainly driven by factors such as the decline in the benchmark interest rate, credit expansion, and the resilience of the equity market. The expansion of the financial conditions index is expected to have a more significant impact on the real economy [86][94][96]. 3.2.3 Economic Structure - **Forward - looking and backward - looking indicators**: The US economy is currently in a situation where forward - looking indicators are improving while backward - looking indicators are still weak. It is expected that the backward - looking indicators will improve in 2026 [101]. - **Inflation**: Inflation is expected to remain above the Fed's target in 2026, with a CPI growth rate of 2.8%. The "pro - cyclical inflation" will have a relatively limited impact on macro - assets [103][104]. - **Employment**: The employment market is trending downward, supporting the Fed's interest - rate cut tendency. The unemployment rate is expected to rise to 4.5% in the first half of 2026 and then fall to 4.4% in the second half [114]. - **Consumption**: Personal consumption is expected to remain stable in 2026, showing a K - shaped differentiation. Consumption may be weak in the first half due to income factors and will be boosted by the employment market and fiscal policies in the second half [121][122]. - **Private fixed investment**: Private fixed investment is expected to be a highlight in 2026, with a significant improvement in the quarter - on - quarter growth rate. However, the structure is differentiated, and it is necessary to follow industry Alpha [128][129]. 3.2.4 Debate on the "AI Bubble" - The "AI bubble" reflects concerns about the sustainability of AI investment, debt, and return on investment. At the index level, there is no systematic risk for now, but the risk is concentrated in leading technology companies. It is recommended to track risks through indicators such as ROIC - WACC, credit market risk exposure, and the profit erosion of depreciation and amortization [135][137][147]. 3.3 US Treasury Bond Market - In 2026, the long - term US Treasury bond yield has limited trends, with an upward - risk bias. The 10 - year US Treasury bond interest - rate center may be around 4.20%, with support at 3.95 - 4.00 and the first target at 4.35% and the second target at 4.65%. The 2 - year US Treasury bond yield has support at around 3.20% and a target of 3.68%. The yield curve may show a "bull steepening" in the first half and a "bear steepening" in the second half [163][164]. 3.4 US Dollar Index - The US dollar index is expected to maintain a wide - range oscillation in 2026, with an annual oscillation range of 96 - 108 and an upward - risk bias. The oscillation range in the first quarter of 2026 is 97.7 - 102. Attention should be paid to the rhythm of economic relative strength, the marginal change of interest - rate differentials, and carry - trade themes [172][180].

Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant information provided. Core Viewpoints of the Report - In 2026, as the Fed cuts interest rates (market expects a cut to 3.0 - 3.25% by the end of 2026), commodities may bottom out and present allocation opportunities [1]. - The 10 - year Chinese Treasury bond interest rate is expected to oscillate in the range of 1.5 - 2.0%. Slow fiscal spending and inflation recovery will limit the downside space of Treasury bond futures [1]. - The Shanghai Composite Index will oscillate at a high level. It is recommended to be cautiously bullish, appropriately reduce positions, and pay attention to the Fed's subsequent interest - rate cut process and specific measures to expand terminal consumption in China [1]. Summary by Related Catalogs 2025 Review - In 2025, there was a divergence in Sino - US commodities, with US commodities being stronger and Chinese commodities being weaker. The overall view at the end of 2024 for 2025 was that Treasury bonds would oscillate, stock indices would be slightly bullish, and commodities would be bearish, which was generally correct, except that US commodities were stronger than expected [5]. - In the US, with the Fed's interest - rate cuts, Trump's policies of adding tariffs externally, cutting taxes internally, and restricting immigration, the US economy may face stagflation risks. In China, the real estate market still faced pressure in recovery, private fixed - asset investment decreased year - on - year, and demand was weak. Although a more proactive fiscal policy brought short - term impacts on the stock, bond, and commodity markets, commodities then trended towards reality [5]. - Overseas, on April 2, Trump issued a more - than - expected reciprocal tariff policy, causing commodity prices to plummet. Subsequently, commodity and energy prices continued to weaken. The Fed cut interest rates twice in September and October to address weak employment. The US economy showed stagflation characteristics [5]. - Domestically, after a rebound at the beginning of the year, commercial housing sales continued to weaken, and domestic demand remained weak. In October, China's PPI was - 2.1% and CPI was 0.2%, the first positive CPI growth in Q2 2025 but still at a low level. The prices of domestic - priced black commodities slightly rebounded due to anti - involution meetings and production - cut plans but weakened again as anti - involution expectations cooled. The 10 - year Treasury bond interest rate strengthened and oscillated at a high level [6]. 2026 Outlook US - The US economic growth is expected to slow down moderately, presenting a pattern of "slowing employment and consumption - high inflation and deficits". The high deficit rate of nearly 6% makes government debt unsustainable. The contradiction between high interest rates and fiscal deficit sustainability is becoming more prominent, posing potential risks to the US economy [8]. - It is estimated that the real GDP growth rate in the US will be about 1.8% in 2026, showing a moderately slowing trend. Consumption and import growth are expected to slow down as fiscal deficits decline; private - sector construction investment growth is expected to continue to slow down due to trade - friction uncertainties, the decline of investment tax credits, and doubts about the sustainability of AI capital expenditure; the consumption and inventory cycles face certain downward pressure [10]. - The labor market shows weak signals. In 2025, the number of new jobs in the US was consistently below 200,000, and the unemployment rate continued to rise. In September 2025, the number of new non - farm jobs was 119,000, and the unemployment rate was 4.4%. It is expected that the US will still face high unemployment in 2026, and solving labor - market weakness may be the primary goal of monetary and fiscal policies [12]. - The US CPI growth rate is expected to be in the range of 2.2 - 2.9% in 2026, maintaining a relatively high inflation level. Factors contributing to inflation resilience include high salaries and personal consumption expenditures, Trump's policies with inflation - promoting attributes, and the "dovish" stance of the new Fed chairman, which may push up inflation through interest - rate cut expectations [16]. - In 2026, the US will still be in an interest - rate cut cycle, but the path is not smooth. The market expects the federal funds rate to be reduced to the 3.0 - 3.25% range. If inflation does not decline as expected, it will make the interest - rate cut space volatile and increase market fluctuations [18]. - The sustainability of the US fiscal deficit is being tested. The US national debt exceeded 38 trillion US dollars in October 2025. The "Big and Beautiful Act" is expected to add about 3.4 trillion US dollars in fiscal deficits in the next decade, on top of the debt accumulated by the "Tax Cuts and Jobs Act". To reduce the fiscal deficit rate to 3%, a combination of reducing fiscal spending, increasing fiscal revenue, and cutting interest rates is required [19]. China - China's inflation data was weak in 2025. With the support of policies such as the 14th Five - Year Plan and anti - involution, inflation is expected to bottom out in 2026. In October 2025, China's PPI was - 2.1% year - on - year, and CPI was 0.2% year - on - year. After an increase in commercial housing sales within the year, it declined again, and the year - on - year increase in M1 was significant [24]. - In the short term, it is still difficult to see an obvious upward trend in inflation. The Fed's high - interest - rate policy in H1 2025 pressured China's exports; the decline in commercial housing prices led to continuous negative growth in new household credit and real - estate investment, and it is difficult to reverse the weakening trend of housing prices under the "housing is for living in, not for speculation" principle; there is over - capacity in some industries, and the aging population has depressed private - sector demand. The implementation of anti - involution policies and production cuts due to processing losses are expected to increase bottom - level fluctuations in commodities in 2026 [26]. - Monetary policy will maintain a supportive stance, with reserve - requirement ratio cuts and interest - rate cuts to ensure sufficient market liquidity, and new structural monetary policy tools to support the development of small and micro enterprises. The reasons for strengthening supportive monetary policy include high real interest rates due to slow inflation and the need to create a more liquid environment for economic development and local - government leverage management [27]. - To boost inflation and economic growth, China needs a combination of fiscal, stock - market, real - estate, and consumption - subsidy policies. In 2025, the central bank only adjusted the LPR once in May. The weakening real - estate market has weakened the wealth effect, consumer confidence, and domestic demand, and strengthened residents' savings motivation. In October 2025, China's household deposit balance exceeded 160 trillion yuan, almost double the level at the end of 2019 before the pandemic [28]. - The bull market in the Chinese stock market in 2025 led to a deposit - transfer effect, but it has not been transmitted to the consumption end. The number of new stock - market accounts increased with the rise of the CSI 300, but may decline in November and December. In 2025, new RMB loans were at a five - year low, while new government bonds increased, indicating an expansionary fiscal policy. The M1 - M2 gap narrowed significantly, but consumption data did not improve significantly. To transmit the deposit - transfer effect to consumption in 2026, the stock - market bull market needs to continue, and policies need to boost consumption [30]. 2026 Allocation Outlook - In the US, with a downward - shifting interest - rate center and high inflation, the US economic resilience is expected to decline, consumption and imports will fall, and employment may be poor. Expansionary fiscal policies may cause debt - sustainability issues. The yield of US Treasury bonds will oscillate at a high level between 3.5 - 4.5%, the US dollar will oscillate between 95 - 100 (±3), gold prices are high, and non - ferrous metals should be over - allocated. Attention should be paid to trading opportunities arising from the oscillation of US consumption and imports [33]. - In China, with a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately loose monetary policy, inflation is expected to bottom out in 2026, and PPI will rise to - 0.5 - - 1%. There is room for interest - rate cuts in the monetary - policy end. With liquidity support, A - shares are expected to remain active in trading, and Treasury bond yields present allocation opportunities. The implementation of the 14th Five - Year Plan and anti - involution policies may support commodity prices at the bottom, and prices may bottom out in H2 2026 [33]. - In asset allocation, non - ferrous metals and Treasury bonds should be over - allocated, and equities should be neutrally allocated: - The yield of 10 - year US Treasury bonds will oscillate widely between 3.5% - 4.5% and is expected to decline [33]. - The US dollar is expected to oscillate between 95 - 100 (±3). Attention should be paid to improvements in the US fiscal and trade deficits, which will affect the Fed's interest - rate cuts and the US dollar's downward trend [34]. - Gold is expected to oscillate at a high level between 4400 - 4500. It is relatively expensive, and some non - ferrous rare - earth metals should be allocated. Global central - bank gold purchases and the Fed's interest - rate cut cycle will push up the gold - price center [34]. - The target of the CSI 300 is 4300 - 5200 points. Attention should be paid to the boost of policies in the 14th Five - Year Plan to the technology and energy sectors, and the continuation of the structural bull market in H2 2025. Also, pay attention to the re - balance between stocks and bonds [34]. - The yield of 10 - year Chinese Treasury bonds is expected to oscillate between 1.5 - 2.0%, and there will be good allocation opportunities when the interest rate rises to 2.0% [34]. - Commodities are expected to present bottom - level allocation opportunities in 2026. Attention should be paid to phased opportunities in H2 2026, such as crude oil, coking coal, live pigs, and some chemical products [34][35].

Report Industry Investment Rating - The report maintains a view that the overall situation of treasury bond futures will be fluctuating with a downward bias, indicating a relatively cautious investment attitude towards the bond market [4]. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The current interest rate is supported by the central bank and capped by the fundamentals. The restraint of the central bank's monetary policy, the disappointment in bond - buying, the redistribution of new funds between the equity and fixed - income markets due to the entry of long - term funds, and the unfalsifiable "14th Five - Year Plan" policies in the next year limit the significant decline in long - term interest rates. The trend of commodities and inflation expectations may make the bond market face more headwinds [3]. - The report maintains the view that the overall situation of treasury bond futures will be fluctuating with a downward bias. In addition to short - selling hedging at high prices and long - position substitution at low prices under the high - selling and low - buying framework, strategies such as positive spreads trading and long positions in inter - delivery spreads under the timing framework are also recommended [4]. Summary According to the Table of Contents 1. Anti - involution Policy Consolidates the Inflation Floor 1.1 Inflation Floor Consolidation Disturbs the Pricing of Real Interest Rates - In 2025, the overall operation of treasury bond futures was tortuous. The market showed a high - level shock in the first half of the year and a fluctuating downward trend except in October. The 30Y - 10Y spread widened from about 10bp at the beginning of the year to over 30bp [7]. - The macro - economy remained in the bottom - shock pattern. Exports were affected by the Sino - US trade war in the first half of the year, and domestic demand recovery was not significant. In the second half of the year, the policy intensity declined, and the GDP growth rate slowed down in the third and fourth quarters due to weak downstream demand [7]. - The "asset shortage" of RMB assets still exists, but the structure has changed. The net long - position in treasury bond futures has decreased, and the market's expectations for the bond market have diverged. After the anti - involution policy, the bond market showed a fluctuating downward trend [9]. - The capital market reform policies have increased the importance of the equity market, and the "slow - bull" of the equity market has become the "political correctness" of the capital market. If the Fed cuts interest rates further and domestic policies are arranged beyond expectations next year, the equity market will continue to recover, and the bond market will only have structural opportunities [9]. 1.2 Monetary Policy Orientation and Micro - analysis of Treasury Bond Futures - The statements in the Q1 monetary policy implementation report indicated that the central bank's next - stage focus was to increase inflation, promote growth, and reduce costs. However, the bond market's recovery did not exceed the high at the beginning of the year. After the introduction of policies such as anti - involution and the resumption of the collection of value - added tax on bond interest, the market's inflation expectations and the central bank's orientation changed rapidly, and the market showed a fluctuating downward trend from the middle of the year [20]. - The Q2 report emphasized the importance of structure, and the Q3 report aimed to maintain a relatively loose liquidity environment. The central bank's bond - buying, interest - rate cuts, and reserve - requirement ratio cuts at the end of the year were less than expected. In the framework of the unfalsifiable "14th Five - Year Plan" policies and the relatively restrained monetary policy next year, treasury bond futures may continue to fluctuate within a range with a downward bias [20]. - In terms of market characteristics, the trading volume of the 12 - contract is limited, and the short - term inter - delivery spread may be positively correlated with the market. The basis has converged during the repair process since early June, and there is a demand for profit - taking in positive hedging. The curve structure has limited factors to support long - term steepening, and the steepening space may be reversed [21]. 2. Maintain the Judgment of Fluctuating and Downward - biased Interest Rates 2.1 Interest Rates are Supported by the Central Bank and Capped by the Fundamentals - Since 2015, China's interest rates have generally shown a downward trend, with three upward trends lasting more than a quarter. The duration and amplitude of these upward trends have gradually decreased, and the economic significance behind them has changed from fundamental and inflation - driven to short - term expectation and policy - driven [30]. - China has been in the passive de - stocking phase for nearly 34 months, longer than the 21 - month period in 1998. The GDP deflator has not turned positive. The second growth curve based on globalization and the real - estate model has encountered difficulties, and the future growth path depends on internal stimulus and external cooperation [30]. - Since the "9.24" in 2024, the policy bottom of the new economic cycle has been clear. The policy orientation of the financial sector is to guide long - term funds into the equity market. Although the fundamental recovery is still insufficient, the policy orientation makes it difficult for the market to break through the previous low of interest rates in the short term. Meanwhile, the limited elasticity of fundamentals and inflation restricts the upward space of interest rates, resulting in a fluctuating market where interest rates are supported by the central bank and capped by the fundamentals. In the long run, the inflow of funds into the equity market may lead to a fluctuating and downward - biased trend in treasury bond futures [31]. 2.2 Market Outlook for 2026 - The report maintains the view that the bond market will be fluctuating with a downward bias since the middle of the year. In addition to short - selling hedging at high prices and long - position substitution at low prices, strategies such as positive spreads trading and long positions in inter - delivery spreads under the timing framework are recommended [38].

Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. Core Viewpoints of the Report - In 2026, the global electric vehicle demand growth rate will tend to be moderate, and the increase in the penetration rate of the structural market will become the core logic. It is estimated that the total global electric vehicle sales will increase by 13% year-on-year to 23.75 million units. China's total sales will increase by 16% year-on-year to 19.12 million units, and domestic demand will increase by 11% to 15.66 million units. In terms of year-on-year increment, China, Western Europe, and emerging Asian regions will contribute 60%, 25%, and 19% respectively, making them the core driving regions, while the American market may have a negative impact [2][81]. - China's electric vehicle market faces the total pressure of the diminishing marginal benefit of the trade-in policy and the increase in purchase tax, and there is a risk of a slowdown in growth. However, the structural market still has bright spots, including the in-depth development of passenger electric vehicles in the sinking market and the electrification of the commercial field. Although the penetration rate of the mid - high - end market has slowed down at around 60%, the penetration rate of the sinking market still has room to catch up, and the penetration rate of the commercial field is expected to increase by 10%. It is estimated that the structural market may have an incremental space of nearly 2.2 million units. However, the sinking market is more cost - sensitive, and the weakening of purchase tax incentives may increase the resistance to the release of sinking consumption power. In addition, the market has a high demand for the continuation of the trade - in policy, but the accumulated over - consumption of replacement demand may reach more than one million units, which may drag down the demand forecast. It is estimated that China's domestic demand is expected to bring an incremental of about 1.6 million units [3][82]. - The incremental overseas market lies in Europe and emerging regions. Europe's new carbon emission cycle is forcing the electrification process forward. Although the cycle target has been temporarily relaxed, the long - term trend remains unchanged. There are both short - term assessment pressure and long - term target driving forces, and many European countries have restarted subsidies to support it. It is estimated that Western Europe is expected to bring an incremental of 600,000 - 700,000 units. At the same time, other emerging Asian regions are still in the subsidy policy cycle, and their electrification progress is catching up with that of mature markets, which is expected to bring an incremental of 400,000 - 500,000 units. On the contrary, the pre - consumption in the US market has been initially realized, and after the policy direction changes, there may be a risk of negative impact [3][82]. Summary According to the Directory 1. 2025 Electric Vehicle Demand Review: China and Europe as the Main Drivers - In the first three quarters of 2025, the global electric vehicle sales increased by 28% year - on - year to 14.63 million units (with an incremental of 3.21 million units year - on - year), and the annual sales in 2025 are expected to increase by 20% year - on - year to more than 20 million units. In terms of market share, China's domestic demand market accounts for 65%, other regions in Asia and Oceania (excluding China) account for 5%, Western Europe accounts for 18%, the Americas account for 10%, Central and Eastern Europe account for 1%, and the Middle East and Africa account for 1% [6]. - In the 3.21 million units of year - on - year incremental, China contributes 64%, other regions in Asia and Oceania (excluding China) contribute 10%, Western Europe contributes 18%, the Americas contribute 5%, Central and Eastern Europe contribute 2%, and the Middle East and Africa contribute 1% [6]. - In terms of penetration rate, the growth rate of China's market penetration rate has slightly slowed down marginally, with the penetration rates from 2022 - 2025 being 26%, 33%, 45%, and 50% respectively; the electrification of other emerging regions in Asia and Oceania has started, and the penetration rate has increased from the historical 4% - 6% to 11% marginally; the European region has been boosted by the new carbon emission cycle, especially in Western Europe, where the penetration rate has increased by 5% to 26% after stagnating at 21% - 22%, and the penetration rate in Central and Eastern Europe has also increased by 3% to 6%; while the growth in the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa is relatively small, with the penetration rate remaining stable and slightly increasing [6]. 2. China: Structural Market Growth, Policy Driving Force Weakening 2.1 Structural Incremental to Make up for the Gap, Electrification Penetration to Increase - The consumption structure of electric vehicles is differentiated, and the penetration rate of the sinking market is expected to catch up. From 2023 - 2025, the penetration rate of the high - end passenger vehicle market (models above 300,000 yuan) has remained stable at a high level, basically running at around 60%, while the sinking market has started in - depth electrification. Automobile enterprises have carried out price cuts, promotions, and new product launches in the domestic market and explored export markets in emerging regions such as Asia, constantly catching up with the penetration rate of high - end electric vehicles. Among them, the penetration rate of the 200,000 - 300,000 yuan market has linearly increased from 38% to 60%, but after reaching 60%, the marginal increase in penetration rate has converged. The penetration rates of the 100,000 - 200,000 yuan and below 180,000 yuan markets have increased from 31% and 28% to 48% respectively. Looking forward, the sinking market will be the core incremental in 2026, and the greatest potential lies in the 100,000 - 200,000 yuan and below 100,000 yuan markets. In the passenger vehicle segment, these two markets account for about 70% in total, and the sales volume is expected to exceed 20 million units in 2025. If it is assumed that the sinking penetration rate is fully made up to 60% in 2026, it is expected to bring an incremental of about 1.7 million units to the domestic demand for electric vehicles [21]. - The electrification of the commercial field has started. Commercial vehicles account for about 13% of automobile demand, mainly including buses and trucks (including tractors), accounting for 15% and 85% of the commercial market respectively. Trucks are further divided into heavy - duty, medium - duty, light - duty, and mini - trucks. If tractors are included in heavy - duty trucks, the four types account for 32%, 5%, 52%, and 11% of the truck market respectively. In 2025, the penetration rate has shown a steep growth trend. The electrification of the commercial field is mainly driven by technological and scenario - based factors. The increase in battery energy density has met the demand for short - and medium - distance urban distribution, and the optimization of cost - effectiveness has made electric vehicles more competitive. Secondly, due to the relatively fixed transportation points compared with passenger vehicles, intelligent technology has solved the customized scenario - based demand, including urban distribution and park transportation. The large - scale replacement of logistics customers is the driving force for the growth of commercial penetration. Therefore, it is expected that the difference in structural penetration rate between the commercial and passenger vehicle fields is expected to be broken. If the penetration rate of commercial vehicles increases by 10% in 2026, it is expected to bring an incremental of about 500,000 units to the demand for electric vehicles [24]. - The average battery capacity per vehicle has started to rise again, and the growth rate of power is expected to exceed that of the terminal. From the perspective of installed capacity to measure the demand for electric vehicles, in the previous transition period from fuel vehicles to electric vehicles, the proportion of PHEV has increased significantly, doubling from less than 20% to more than 40%. The increase in the proportion of low - battery - capacity vehicles and the increase in battery energy density have offset each other's effects, and the average battery capacity per vehicle has basically remained stable from 2021 - 2024. However, in 2025, there has been an important turning point. The growth of the PHEV proportion has stagnated and even declined slightly, which also indicates the transformation of the transition period. In the long term, with the improvement of battery technology, BEV will still be the mainstream direction of electric vehicles. At the same time, since the average battery capacity of BEV/PHEV in commercial vehicles is close to 200/90 KWh, about 3.6/2.8 times that of passenger vehicles respectively, the electrification of the commercial field, combined with the transformation cycle of the technology route, will make the growth rate of electric vehicle demand measured from the perspective of installed capacity more optimistic [31]. 2.2 Policy Driving Force Weakening, Concerns about Demand Remaining - The effectiveness of the trade - in policy has decreased, and attention should be paid to the impact of over - consumption in the long term. In early 2025, the continuation of the trade - in policy filled the vacuum period after the end of the subsidy cycle in 2024, and the policy intensity exceeded market expectations, mainly including three aspects: 1) The subsidy amount remained at the increased level in 2024; 2) The scope of old models eligible for scrap and replacement was expanded; 3) The policy period was longer, covering the whole year. As of the end of October, it can be found that the average daily application volume of subsidies in 2025 reached 34,000, exceeding the average daily application volume in 2024 by 84%. However, marginally, since 54% of the total 300 billion yuan of trade - in funds was allocated in the first half of the year, it provided support for the consumer side. However, the less funds in the second half of the year were mismatched with the seasonality of automobile consumption. In the second half of 2023 and 2024, automobile sales usually accounted for 56% of the annual sales, and for electric vehicles, it even reached 61% - 63%. Therefore, the trade - in policies in various provinces have been decreasing in the second half of the year, and it is expected that the average daily application volume for the whole year will drop to about 31,000 - 32,000, still more than 70% higher than that of last year. Looking forward to 2026, after stimulating the unexpected replacement demand of consumers in 2024 - 2025, it will have a certain over - consumption effect on the long - term demand. In the report "Terminal Demand Logic Switching, Policy Cycle Awaited", the over - consumption effect was evaluated, and it is estimated that the cumulative over - consumption of electric vehicle demand in two years may reach 1.2 - 1.5 million units, which may put pressure on the demand in 2026. Of course, in the stage of economic bottom - building and recovery, the market generally has a high demand for the continuation of the trade - in policy. The continuation of the policy may bring forward the more long - term demand, thereby offsetting the impact on the short - term demand in 2026. Therefore, the continuation intensity of the subsidy policy is still worthy of attention. The Central Economic Work Conference has deployed the economic work for 2026, and the key task mentions "adhering to the domestic demand - led strategy and building a strong domestic market", which involves optimizing the implementation of the "two new" policies, further giving the market expectations for the continuation of the trade - in policy [37]. - The preferential policy for electric vehicle purchase tax has been reduced, and the electrification of the sinking market may not be as expected. According to the purchase tax policy in June 2023, new energy vehicles purchased between 2024 - 2025 are exempt from vehicle purchase tax, but the tax reduction for new energy passenger vehicles should not exceed 30,000 yuan. From 2026 - 2027, new energy vehicles will be subject to a half - reduction in purchase tax, and the tax reduction for each new energy passenger vehicle should not exceed 15,000 yuan. By comparing the previous four policies, the preferential intensity of tax has shown a certain decline, and 2026 may be an important turning point. If this round of preferential policy remains unchanged, the overall demand for electric vehicles in 2026 may face pressure. More importantly, as mentioned above, the core incremental in 2026 lies in the strength of the sinking market, and this part of the market is relatively sensitive to discounts of tens of thousands of yuan. The reduction in the preferential intensity of purchase tax may make the electrification of the sinking market fall short of expectations [41]. 3. Overseas: Different Policy Directions in Europe and the United States, Emerging Regions Catching Up 3.1 Europe's Policy: Both Hard and Soft Measures, Second - Round Electrification Promotion - The European market was under the negative pressure of subsidy withdrawal for three years from 2022 - 2024, and the growth of penetration rate basically stagnated. However, in 2025, the space for subsidy withdrawal narrowed, and the logic switched to a new carbon emission cycle, restarting the electrification cycle. Even in the stage of economic pressure and negative growth of automobile consumption, European electric vehicles still achieved a growth rate of more than 20%, far exceeding market expectations. The growth of the European market does not come from the total volume, but from the policy - driven increase in penetration rate. Among them, Western Europe accounts for more than 90% of the electric vehicle demand in Europe, and the penetration rate increased by 5% to 26% from January to September. The penetration rate in Central and Eastern Europe also increased by 3% to 6% [43]. - The carbon emission target has been marginally relaxed, but the long - term trend remains unchanged. The EU has formulated a series of strict automobile carbon emission regulations in stages, with a five - year cycle. Taking passenger vehicles as an example, the carbon emission target for automobile enterprises from 2020 - 2024 was 115.1 g/km, and the original target starting from 2025 was 93.6 g/km. However, in March 2025, considering the pressure on European automobile enterprises, the European Commission mentioned that the carbon emission assessment pressure in 2025 would be relaxed stage by stage. In May, the European Parliament approved the revised regulation plan for the relaxation of carbon emission requirements, that is, the average carbon emission from 2025 - 2027 only needs to meet the original target. This adjustment is not considered to change the long - term electrification trend, but to ease the short - term pressure on European automobile enterprises. From the deduction of the three - year average target path: due to the phenomenon that some orders were delivered in 2025 after being postponed from 2024, combined with the low base, the growth rate of the European region in 2025 is expected to be more than 26%. On this basis, the consumption of electric vehicles in Europe still needs an annualized growth of 10% from 2026 - 2027 to achieve the target. Therefore, there is still a long - term driving force for electrification [44]. - The short - term target is not the focus, and long - term electrification is the core. In the report "Terminal Demand Logic Switching, Policy Cycle Awaited", the European automobile carbon emission cycle from 2020 - 2024 was reviewed. European automobile enterprises did not just meet the immediate target, but also needed to work hard in advance for the higher target in the next cycle. Although they did not directly meet the target in the first year of the previous cycle, they exceeded the immediate target in the second and third years of the cycle. Facing the long - term target of reducing carbon emissions by half by 2030, European automobile enterprises still need to continue electrification from 2025 - 2029 and may not be short - sighted about the current targets from 2025 - 2027. At the same time, considering the base effect, the growth rate of Europe from 2026 - 2027 is expected to significantly exceed 10%. If the penetration rate reaches 35% in 2026, the growth rate is expected to exceed 18% [45]. - A new round of electrification has started, and Europe has restarted subsidies to support it. Key European countries have introduced subsidy policies: 1) In July, the UK announced a 650 - million - pound electric vehicle subsidy plan, providing a 3,750 - pound subsidy for electric vehicles below 37,000 pounds, and the funds will last until the 2028 - 2029 fiscal year. If it is assumed that the subsidy lasts for 4 years, about 43,000 electric vehicles per year can receive the subsidy; 2) The German government plans to allocate 3 billion euros for electric vehicle subsidies by the end of 2029, mainly targeting low - and middle - income groups. The subsidy will take effect on January 1, 2026. For electric vehicles with a price below 45,000 euros, the subsidy amount can be up to 4,000 euros; 3) In October, Italy launched a new 600 - million - euro subsidy plan, with a maximum subsidy of 11,000

Report Summary 1. Report Industry Investment Rating No investment rating information is provided in the report. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report Based on macro - fundamental and technical analyses, the report predicts the trends of various futures contracts on December 17, 2025, and also provides outlooks for the rest of December 2025 for some contracts. Different futures contracts are expected to have different trends, including oscillating, oscillating strongly, oscillating weakly, etc. [2] 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 Futures Market Outlook Highlights - **Stock Index Futures**: Expected to oscillate and consolidate. For example, IF2512 has resistance levels at 4511 and 4548 points and support levels at 4457 and 4435 points [2]. - **Ten - year Treasury Bond Futures**: The T2603 contract is likely to oscillate widely, with support levels at 107.75 and 107.67 yuan and resistance levels at 107.99 and 108.07 yuan [2]. - **Thirty - year Treasury Bond Futures**: The TL2603 contract is likely to oscillate weakly in a wide range, with support levels at 111.1 and 110.4 yuan and resistance levels at 112.0 and 112.3 yuan [2]. - **Precious Metal Futures**: Gold and silver futures are expected to oscillate strongly; platinum and palladium futures are expected to oscillate strongly and may reach new highs since listing [3]. - **Base Metal Futures**: Copper and tin futures are expected to oscillate widely; aluminum and nickel futures are expected to oscillate weakly; alumina futures are expected to oscillate strongly [4]. - **Other Commodity Futures**: Polycrystalline silicon and lithium carbonate futures are expected to oscillate strongly; crude oil, fuel oil, PTA, PVC, methanol, soybean meal, and palm oil futures are expected to oscillate weakly; rebar, hot - rolled coil, iron ore, glass, and soda ash futures are expected to oscillate widely [4][7][8] 3.2 Macroeconomic News and Trading Tips - **Domestic News**: In 2026, China will focus on expanding domestic demand, stabilize the real estate market from both supply and demand sides, and continue to implement a moderately loose monetary policy. Hainan will officially start the whole - island customs - sealing on December 18, 2025, with an adjustment to the processing value - added duty - free policy and an expansion of the "zero - tariff" import commodity tax items [9]. - **International News**: Trump sued the BBC for $10 billion; the Trump administration threatened to retaliate against the EU for taxing US tech companies; the US economic data showed a mixed picture, with the unemployment rate rising and retail sales data being flat or slightly different from expectations; the EU proposed to relax the "ban on fuel - powered vehicles" requirement in 2035 [10][11][12] 3.3 Commodity Futures - related Information - **Crude Oil**: US crude and Brent crude futures closed down, mainly due to signs of oversupply and progress in the Ukraine - Russia peace talks [13]. - **Precious Metals**: International precious metal futures closed with mixed results, affected by differences among Fed officials on monetary policy, escalating trade tensions, and mixed US employment data [13]. - **Base Metals**: London base metals showed a mixed trend, and the London Metal Exchange plans to set and implement position limits for key and related contracts from July 6, 2026 [14]. - **Currencies**: The on - shore RMB against the US dollar rose, and the US dollar index fell slightly [14][15] 3.4 Futures Market Analysis and Outlook - **Stock Index Futures**: On December 16, 2025, major stock index futures contracts such as IF2512, IH2512, IC2512, and IM2512 all showed a downward trend, with increased short - term downward pressure. They are expected to oscillate and consolidate on December 17 [15][16][18][21]. - **Treasury Bond Futures**: The ten - year T2603 contract had a small increase on December 16, with a weak rebound. The thirty - year TL2603 contract had a decline, with increased downward pressure. On December 17, T2603 is expected to oscillate widely, and TL2603 is expected to oscillate weakly in a wide range [39][41][43][44]. - **Precious Metal Futures**: Gold, silver, platinum, and palladium futures had different trends on December 16. Gold and silver futures are expected to oscillate strongly on December 17, while platinum and palladium futures are expected to oscillate strongly and may reach new highs [44][45][51][56][59]. - **Base Metal Futures**: Copper, aluminum, nickel, and other base metal futures had mixed trends on December 16. Their trends on December 17 are expected to continue the previous predictions, with some oscillating widely, some strongly, and some weakly [62][67][76]. - **Other Commodity Futures**: The trends of other commodity futures such as polycrystalline silicon, lithium carbonate, rebar, etc. on December 16 are analyzed, and their trends on December 17 are predicted in line with the overall outlook [86][93][97]

Report Title - "National Carbon Market: One Thing Gains While Another Loses, Aftershocks Still Linger — Outlook for the Annual Market of the National Carbon Market in 2026" [1] Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the report Core Views of the Report - The macro - emission reduction target will provide an important reference for the downward adjustment path of the power generation industry's quota benchmark value. If 2025 is the peak - year, the average annual emission reduction rate of carbon dioxide from 2026 to 2035 needs to reach about 0.7% - 1.0%. In the neutral power generation growth scenario, the power generation emission intensity in 2026 needs to be reduced by at least about 1.1% - 1.4% compared with 2025. The estimated quota gap rate of the power generation industry in 2025 may expand to about 1.1% - 1.4%, corresponding to an annual gap of about 0.6 - 0.7 billion tons [2]. - The supply capacity of CCER will continue to expand in 2026, which will weaken the upward driving force of carbon prices. The total supply of "new supply + inventory" of CCER in 2026 is expected to reach about 25 - 32.5 million tons. If the CCER price returns to the normal range of "discount to CEA" in 2026, key emission units may use CCER on a large scale to replace quotas or fill compliance gaps [3]. - In 2026, the market will continue to digest the past quota surpluses, but the decline in surpluses is limited. Under the existing policies, the carbon price is expected to rise moderately, but it is difficult to return to the historical high. If new policies can give the market a clear expectation of the emission reduction path, the carbon price is expected to break through the historical high [3]. - The annual strategy is to go long on dips below 70 yuan/ton and take profit above 90 yuan/ton [3] Summary by Relevant Catalogs 2025 Review Carbon Price Breakdown and Limited Rebound - In 2025, the price of China's national carbon market carbon emission allowances (CEA) showed a downward trend, with the price center shifting down by about 35% year - on - year. As of December 5, 2025, the average transaction price of the whole market was about 61.48 yuan/ton, a year - on - year decline of about 35%. The price trend can be divided into three stages: sharp decline in the first three quarters, a sharp drop and then a rebound in October, and a rise and then a fall in mid - November [8]. - The older the year - label of the quota, the firmer the quota price. As of December 5, 2025, the average transaction price of CEA24 was the lowest at about 59.04 yuan/ton, while CEA19 - 20 had the highest average transaction price at 75.13 yuan/ton [13] Nearly 9% Annual Turnover Rate and Increased Share of Listing Transactions - Thanks to "advance allocation" and "quota carry - over", the market trading activity continued to improve. As of December 5, 2025, the cumulative trading volume was about 194.23 million tons, the cumulative turnover was about 11.9 billion yuan, and the annual turnover rate was nearly 9%. The cumulative trading volume increased by about 53% year - on - year, and the turnover rate increased by 5.3 percentage points [15]. - Bulk agreement transactions still dominated, but the share of listing agreement transactions increased significantly, rising by about 11 percentage points year - on - year. The one - way call auction trading introduced in July was relatively inactive due to the rule setting and the market decline [17][19]. - CEA24 was the main trading target in 2025, accounting for about 71% of the trading volume as of December 5, 2025 [19] Four Key Policy Nodes Affected Market Trading Rhythm - The "rectification and volume increase" expectation in February was falsified as the 2023 compliance completion rate was high. The release of the expansion plan in March led to the release of forced - circulation quotas. The pre - allocation of quotas in April and the stable recovery of carbon prices doubled the market trading scale. The final allocation of quotas in August led to the largest concentrated trading volume of the year. The release of the quota plan for newly - included industries in November increased the potential demand, but the actual procurement demand was limited [21][24][25] 2026 Supply - Demand Outlook Power Generation Industry: Disassembling Macro - Emission Reduction Targets to Anchor the Downward Adjustment Path of Benchmark Values - China's attitude towards achieving the 2030 intensity target is relatively prudent, leaving room for policy adjustment. When setting the 2035 emission target, China took a relatively cautious attitude, leaving necessary strategic space for the implementation of the 2030 intensity target [33]. - Assuming 2025 as the peak - year, the average annual emission reduction rate of carbon dioxide from 2026 to 2035 needs to reach about 0.7% - 1.0%. In the neutral power generation growth scenario, the power generation emission intensity in 2026 needs to be reduced by at least about 1.1% - 1.4% compared with 2025. The estimated quota gap rate of the power generation industry in 2025 may expand to about 1.1% - 1.4%, corresponding to an annual gap of about 0.6 - 0.7 billion tons [38][39][44] CCER: Expanding Supply Capacity and Weakening the Upward Driving Force of Carbon Prices - The CCER market restarted in January 2022, but the project development rhythm was slower than expected in the early stage due to factors such as methodological disputes and the slowdown of project review and verification by the regulatory authorities [45]. - The CCER supply in 2025 was about 15 million tons, and about 5 million tons were used for 2024 compliance. The estimated market surplus at the end of 2025 was about 10 million tons [47][49]. - It is estimated that the new supply of CCER in 2026 will be 15 - 22.5 million tons, and the total supply of "new supply + inventory" is expected to reach about 25 - 32.5 million tons. If the CCER price returns to the normal range of "discount to CEA", it may significantly weaken the annual supply - demand contradiction in the national carbon market [52][53] 2026 Market Outlook - In 2026, the quota gap in the power generation industry may expand, but it will be partially offset by the increase in CCER supply. The market will continue to digest the past quota surpluses, but the decline in surpluses is limited [55]. - In the first half of 2026, the market may be in a "near - stagnant" state. The carry - over rule will still have a residual impact on the market, and the market confidence needs to be restored before the introduction of new policies [55][56]. - Under the existing policies, the carbon price is expected to rise moderately, but it is difficult to return to the historical high. If new policies can give the market a clear expectation of the emission reduction path, the carbon price is expected to break through the historical high [58]

Report Industry Investment Rating The report does not mention the industry investment rating. Core View of the Report In 2026, the power market is expected to maintain a pattern of loose supply and demand, and the downward pressure on electricity prices remains. On the supply side, thermal power is still in the peak production period, and the new installed capacity of wind and solar power will still reach about 300GW but with negative year - on - year growth. On the demand side, the growth rate of全社会 electricity consumption is expected to moderately rebound to about 5.4%. Electric energy prices are expected to continue to decline, while non - electric energy prices may rise slightly. Regional electricity prices will show differentiation [2][70][71]. Summary According to the Directory 1. 2025 Power Market Review - **Power Supply**: The growth rate of power generation has slowed down. From January to October, the power generation of above - scale enterprises increased by 2.3% year - on - year. The new installed capacity of power equipment was about 397.84 million kilowatts, a year - on - year increase of 42.6%. New energy and thermal power were the main sources of installed capacity growth. The utilization hours of thermal power units decreased [6][14]. - **Power Demand**: The growth rate of electricity consumption slowed down. From January to October, the total electricity consumption of the whole society was about 8.62 trillion kilowatt - hours, a year - on - year increase of 5.1%. The electricity consumption rhythm was significantly affected by temperature. The growth rate of electricity consumption in the secondary industry was under pressure, while that in the tertiary industry and residents' living increased relatively fast [17][18]. - **Power Price**: Most provincial electricity prices continued to decline. From January to November, only 9 provinces such as Inner Mongolia West, Qinghai, and Ningxia saw year - on - year increases in the industrial and commercial agency power purchase prices, while the rest showed varying degrees of decline [23]. 2. Power Supply and Demand Outlook - **Power Supply**: In 2026, thermal power will still be in the peak production period, with an expected new installed capacity of about 103GW, a year - on - year increase of 12%. The new installed capacity of wind and solar power will total about 300GW, but the growth rate will decline. The new installed capacity of hydropower and nuclear power is expected to be about 23GW and 12GW respectively [26][30][33]. - **Power Demand**: The power consumption elasticity coefficient is expected to rise slightly to about 1.1. With a GDP growth expectation of 4.7%, the growth rate of全社会 electricity consumption in 2026 is expected to reach about 5.4%, showing a moderate rebound [35]. - **Supply - Demand Balance**: The marginal surplus of electric energy may continue. The utilization hours of thermal power units are expected to decrease, and the power generation of hydropower, wind power, and nuclear power is expected to increase [39]. 3. Key Regional Electricity Price Outlook - **Overall Situation**: Electric energy prices may remain weak, while non - electric energy costs are expected to rise. The cost of capacity electricity price is expected to increase significantly, and the impact of auxiliary service costs on the terminal electricity price is relatively limited [43][46]. - **Guangdong**: In 2026, the medium - and long - term electricity price will likely operate near the floor price, and the marginal change is limited. The spot price center is expected to move down slightly. The increase in non - electric energy costs is relatively limited, and the industrial and commercial electricity price is expected to decrease by 15 - 20 yuan/MWh [50][54]. - **Shandong**: The spot electricity price is expected to remain weakly volatile. The medium - and long - term electric energy price is expected to drop to 330 - 340 yuan/MWh. Due to the increase in non - electric energy costs, the overall electricity cost reduction is about 10 - 15 yuan/MWh [55][59]. - **Inner Mongolia West**: The electricity price is expected to continue to decline, mainly driven by the continuous development of new energy. The cancellation of the risk prevention mechanism may further drive down the electricity price. Non - electric energy costs have little impact on the terminal electricity price [62][63]. - **Shanxi**: The decline of electric energy prices is limited. The non - electric energy costs will increase significantly. The terminal industrial and commercial electricity price is expected to increase slightly by about 10 yuan/MWh [69]. 4. Summary In 2025, the power market was in a pattern of loose supply and demand, and electricity prices generally declined. In 2026, this pattern is expected to continue. Electric energy prices are expected to continue to decline, while non - electric energy prices may rise slightly. Regional electricity prices will show differentiation [70][71][72].

Report Summary 1. Investment Rating The report does not provide an investment rating for the industry. 2. Core Viewpoints - In 2025, driven by the capacity compensation policy and the accelerated construction of the power market, the economy of domestic independent energy storage projects significantly improved, leading to strong growth in overall energy storage demand. The US and European markets continued their steady growth, and emerging markets such as the Middle East and Australia continued to expand. It is estimated that the global new installed capacity in 2025 will reach 271GWh, a year-on-year increase of 45%. The expected good terminal demand prompted enterprises to increase their inventory coefficients, and the annual battery cell shipments are expected to reach 550GWh, a year-on-year increase of 65% [2]. - Looking ahead to 2026, the high returns of independent energy storage are expected to continue, and the large-scale winning bids for domestic projects lay the foundation for demand. Under the neutral scenario, the domestic new installed capacity is expected to be 284GWh, and in the optimistic scenario, it can reach 325GWh, achieving a doubling growth. Overseas, the US may face certain pressure in the short term due to the cost increase brought by the "Big and Beautiful" Act and the unmanifested energy storage demand related to data centers. The new installed capacity is expected to be 50GWh, a year-on-year increase of 4%. Europe will benefit from the profitability improvement brought by grid investment and trading mechanism optimization, and the new installed capacity is expected to reach 43GWh, a year-on-year increase of 39%. Chile, Australia, the Middle East, and India are the main sources of incremental growth in emerging markets, and the total new installed capacity in emerging markets is expected to reach 87GWh, a year-on-year increase of 68%. Overall, in 2026, the global new energy storage installed capacity is expected to reach 505GWh in the optimistic scenario, a year-on-year increase of 86%; 464GWh in the neutral scenario, a year-on-year increase of 71%; and 368GWh in the rigid scenario, a year-on-year increase of 36% [3]. - In the context of high terminal demand, the probability of a significant reduction in the inventory coefficient is low. However, it is necessary to consider the overdrawn demand in some markets. The US has limited additional inventory space in 2026, and Australia faces a similar situation. A total of about 60GWh of additional inventory demand needs to be deducted from the two regions. In 2026, the energy storage battery cell shipments are expected to reach 957GWh in the optimistic scenario, a year-on-year increase of 74%; 833GWh in the neutral scenario, a year-on-year increase of 52%; and 649GWh in the rigid scenario, a year-on-year increase of 18% [4]. 3. Summary by Directory 1. 2025 Energy Storage Market Review - **Domestic Market**: In 2025, from January to October, the new installed capacity of domestic new energy storage continued to grow rapidly. The new installed capacity of new energy storage reached 34.6GW/92.6GWh, a year-on-year increase of 42.6%. The proportion of grid-side energy storage increased to 60%, and the proportions of power source-side and user-side were 31% and 9% respectively. The price of energy storage continued to decline, but the decline has significantly narrowed. It is estimated that the new installed capacity of new energy storage in 2025 will reach 53.1GW/140GWh, a year-on-year increase of 31% [7][9]. - **Overseas Market**: The demand in overseas markets continued to be strong. From January to October 2025, China's energy storage battery cell exports reached 79.5GWh, a year-on-year increase of 86%. The US energy storage market maintained high-speed growth, and it is estimated that the new installed capacity in 2025 will reach 48GWh, a year-on-year increase of nearly 30%. The European energy storage market showed structural differentiation, with different performances in Germany, Italy, and the UK [13][19][26]. 2. Domestic Market: The Resonance of Rigid Demand for Consumption and Economy Opens Up the Upside Space for Installation - **Rigid Demand**: The continuous increase in the penetration rate of new energy has intensified the "duck curve" problem, and the ability of energy storage to regulate has become a rigid demand. The state has issued top-level documents to promote the consumption of new energy, and new energy storage is becoming a key tool to improve the consumption capacity of new energy. It is estimated that from 2026 to 2030, the installed capacity of new energy storage needs to reach 386GW, corresponding to an installed capacity of 1081GWh and an average annual installed capacity of 216GWh [32][34][36]. - **Economic Driving Force**: The driving logic of the domestic energy storage market has changed fundamentally. Independent energy storage has become the core driving force for the development of the domestic energy storage market. The economy of independent energy storage mainly comes from peak-valley spread arbitrage, auxiliary service market revenue, and capacity price compensation. The implementation of the capacity price compensation policy in multiple provinces will significantly improve the revenue level of energy storage projects [37][38][42]. - **Demand Outlook**: The energy storage bidding market has been active this year. It is estimated that the new installed capacity of energy storage in 2026 will be about 284GWh under the neutral scenario and about 325GWh under the optimistic scenario. The market generally expects that a national capacity price compensation policy will be introduced next year, and the compensation standard is expected to be linked to thermal power. Although the long-term demand in 2027 still has policy uncertainties, the trend of marginal improvement in the revenue of energy storage projects is clear [46][51]. 3. Overseas Market: The US is Under Pressure, While Europe and Emerging Markets Continue to Grow at a High Rate - **US**: The incremental installation of energy storage in the US in 2026 is expected to be limited. The "Big and Beautiful" Act may lead to an increase in manufacturing costs, which will suppress the demand in the US energy storage market to a certain extent. The revenue of energy storage projects in the US is facing downward pressure, and the new installed capacity may be slightly affected. The demand for energy storage in data centers has not been fully realized in the short term [54][55][59]. - **Europe**: The large-scale energy storage market in Europe is expected to continue to grow at a high rate in 2026, with the new installed capacity expected to reach 25GWh, a year-on-year increase of 54%. The post-meter energy storage market is showing a warming trend, with the new installed capacity of industrial and commercial energy storage expected to reach 6.9GWh, a year-on-year increase of 48%, and the new installed capacity of household energy storage expected to reach 10.7GWh, a year-on-year increase of 10% [63][67]. - **Emerging Markets**: The demand in emerging markets is booming, and the market increment is significant. The energy storage markets in Chile, Australia, the Middle East, and India are all expected to achieve rapid growth in 2026 [70][72][75]. 4. Demand Outlook: The Resonance of Domestic and Overseas Demand Accelerates the Release of Energy Storage Shipments - In 2025, the domestic demand continued to rise, the US and European markets maintained steady growth, and emerging markets such as the Middle East, Australia, and India continued to expand. It is estimated that the global new energy storage installed capacity in 2025 will reach 271GWh, and the battery cell shipments will reach 550GWh [80]. - In 2026, the domestic demand is expected to be further released, the US market is under short-term pressure, and the high growth rate of Europe and emerging markets is expected to continue. In the optimistic scenario, the global new energy storage installed capacity is expected to reach 505GWh; in the neutral scenario, it is expected to reach 464GWh; and in the rigid scenario, it is expected to reach 368GWh. The battery cell shipments are expected to reach 957GWh in the optimistic scenario, 833GWh in the neutral scenario, and 649GWh in the rigid scenario [80][82].

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - Globally, major photovoltaic - installing countries face a decline in growth. In 2026, the expected global new - installed capacity is about 493GW, a 13% year - on - year decrease from 2025, entering a negative growth channel [2][62]. - In the domestic market, the marginal negative impact of the "Document No. 136" policy will gradually emerge and continue into 2026. Centralized installation may not see a significant decline in growth, while distributed installation may experience a continuous slowdown. It is expected that the new domestic photovoltaic installed capacity in 2026 will be 200GW, with a year - on - year growth rate of - 33% [2][62]. - In the overseas market, the photovoltaic installation growth in Europe may decline due to economic weakness and subsidy reduction, and the US market may also see a weakening in installation. However, markets like India and the Middle East will still have high installation growth rates with policy support. The overseas new photovoltaic installed capacity in 2026 is expected to be 293GW, with a year - on - year growth rate of + 11% [2][62]. 3. Summaries Based on the Table of Contents 3.1 2025 Photovoltaic Market Review - **Global Market**: The global new installed capacity in 2025 was 566GW, and the year - on - year growth rate declined to 4% [4][5]. - **Domestic Market**: It is a policy - sensitive market with a front - high and back - low installation rhythm. Affected by the "Document No. 136", the installation enthusiasm in the second half of 2025 decreased significantly. The new installed capacity from January to October was 252.9GW, a 39% year - on - year increase. It is expected that the full - year new installed capacity will be 298GW, with a 7% year - on - year growth [5]. - **US Market**: Under the policy negative of the "Big and Beautiful Act", the photovoltaic installation growth rate continued to decline. From January to September, the cumulative installed capacity was 23.2GW, a 6% year - on - year increase, and the cumulative growth rate continued to fall. It is expected that the full - year new installed capacity will be 40GW, an 8% year - on - year increase. The import of components and cells also decreased, and the import sources changed [7]. - **European Market**: With the subsidy decline, the overall growth rate slowed down. Germany, Spain, Poland, and the UK all showed different degrees of decline or growth rate decline. It is expected that the full - year new installed capacity in Europe will be 71.3GW, a 5% year - on - year decrease. China's exports to Europe also decreased, and the European component inventory decreased [10][16]. - **Indian Market**: Policy subsidies stimulated the local installation demand. From January to October, the new installed capacity was 32.1GW, a 71% year - on - year increase. It is expected that the full - year installed capacity will reach 40GW [18]. 3.2 2026 Photovoltaic Market Outlook - **Global Market**: The expected global new installed capacity in 2026 is 493GW, a 13% year - on - year decrease [4][62]. - **Domestic Market**: The negative impact of policies will lead to a significant reduction in new installed capacity. The economic and profitability of photovoltaic grid - connected will decrease, and although energy storage may increase the installation enthusiasm in the long - term, it is difficult to support the installation in 1 - 2 years. It is expected that the new installed capacity in 2026 will be 200GW, a 33% year - on - year decrease [20][35]. - **US Market**: Under the influence of trade barriers, subsidy cancellation, and other factors, the photovoltaic installation will continue to weaken. The "Big and Beautiful Act" restricts future installations, and the double - anti - investigation on India, Indonesia, and Laos will increase the cost of imports. It is expected that the new installed capacity in 2026 will be 35GW, a 13% year - on - year decrease [38][46]. - **European Market**: In the context of economic weakness, the government's subsidy reduction will lead to a slowdown in demand. Considering the grid's carrying capacity limit, the photovoltaic installation growth rate will remain weak. It is expected that the new installed capacity in 2026 will be 69GW, a 3% year - on - year decrease [54]. - **Indian Market**: Government subsidies will continue to stimulate the photovoltaic installation demand. Although there are policies to promote local industries, it is expected that the new installed capacity in 2026 will be 50GW, a 25% year - on - year increase [56][61].

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant information provided. 2. Core Views of the Report - In 2026, the fundamental contradictions in the Shanghai nickel market are accumulating, and the volatility is expected to increase. The static reference range is 95,000 - 130,000 yuan/ton. The overall supply - demand surplus pressure persists. The supply side may experience a path switch. The second - phase expansion of low - cost hydrometallurgical production may impact pyrometallurgical processes, and the traditional nickel - to - ferronickel conversion path may face clearance risks. The pricing of various nickel products is expected to gradually converge, with the lower limit anchored to the full cost of hydrometallurgical production. The upward drive depends on Indonesian policy disturbances [2][107]. - Stainless steel has shifted from a situation of strong supply and weak demand to a situation of weak supply and demand. It may tend to fluctuate at the bottom, with limited downward potential. The increase in hydrometallurgical nickel supply may indirectly increase the pressure on pyrometallurgical production but does not directly replace it in the stainless - steel production line. The cost of the pyrometallurgical path is still the bottom - line anchor for stainless steel, with a reasonable safety margin. The upper limit of the price depends on Indonesian and domestic macro - policies, with a static reference range of 12,000 - 13,200 yuan/ton [2][107]. - In terms of strategies, when facing a weak smelting - end fundamental situation and high uncertainty at the mining end, two approaches can be considered: for short - selling, avoid chasing short positions at low prices, consider short - selling at high prices with option protection to avoid extreme Indonesian risk events; for long - buying, dynamically track the cost of hydrometallurgical nickel, including the prices of by - product cobalt and auxiliary sulfur, to find a good safety margin. For stainless steel, the cost still provides support, and the safety margin is better than that of nickel. In 2026, the overall strategy is to try long positions when the price hits the bottom, but avoid over - chasing high prices without clear policy implementation. Also, pay attention to the opportunity of going long on stainless steel and short on nickel when the nickel - to - steel ratio is high, and consider the possibility of periodic domestic - foreign positive/negative arbitrage [3][108]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 2025 Review of Nickel and Stainless - Steel Trends: Volatility Narrowed, and the Market Trended Weakly in Fluctuations - In 2025, the overall volatility of nickel and stainless - steel narrowed, and the oscillation center gradually moved downward. From January to March, they trended strongly, with the highest increases approaching 9% and 6% respectively, driven by mining - end rainy seasons, Indonesian quota approvals, and inventory replenishment by major traders. From April to June, they first declined and then rebounded, shifting from fundamental to macro - logical drivers. From July to November, they trended weakly in fluctuations, with the center gradually moving down due to factors such as inventory build - up expectations and weakening demand [5]. 3.2 The Production Cycle Shifts to Hydrometallurgy, Be Wary of Indonesian Mining - End Risks 3.2.1 The Supply of Refined Nickel and Nickel Sulfate Depends on Front - End Smelting - In 2025, the back - end smelting production cycle entered the second half, and the industrial model change led to structural contradictions in supply and demand. The global refined nickel output from January to October increased by 50,000 tons year - on - year to 900,000 tons, with a cumulative year - on - year growth rate of 6%, mainly contributed by China. The global nickel sulfate output from January to October decreased by 10,000 tons year - on - year to 420,000 tons, with a cumulative year - on - year growth rate of - 2%. However, in mid - 2025, China's supply elasticity was released due to a temporary recovery in new - energy demand [9]. - There were structural contradictions in supply and demand. Intermediate products and nickel sulfate were in short supply, while refined nickel inventories increased significantly. The high inventory and selling pressure of refined nickel squeezed the valuation of Shanghai nickel. The tightness of intermediate products was due to the transformation of the industrial model, with resources integrating towards "integrated" or "equity resource + toll - processing" enterprises [10]. - The supply contradiction is concentrated in the front - end, and the increase depends on hydrometallurgical supply. The planned intermediate product projects from 2026 - 2027 may have a total capacity of over 600,000 tons, with hydrometallurgical projects accounting for 87% of the capacity. It is expected that the production of Indonesian MHP in 2025 and 2026 will increase by 130,000 and 160,000 tons year - on - year to 460,000 and 620,000 tons respectively, and the production of Indonesian oxygen - enriched side - blown ferronickel will increase by 20,000 and 30,000 tons year - on - year to 40,000 and 70,000 tons respectively [17][19]. - The competitiveness of RKEF conversion to ferronickel may continue to weaken. In 2025, the volume of converted ferronickel decreased by 100,000 tons year - on - year to 270,000 tons. In 2026, due to the increasing year - on - year growth of MHP and oxygen - enriched side - blown ferronickel, the supply of converted ferronickel may face more severe challenges [25]. 3.2.2 The Incremental Supply of Ferronickel is Limited, but the Stock Elasticity is Still High - In 2025, the supply of Indonesian ferronickel continued to squeeze the Chinese and overseas markets. The global ferronickel output from January to October increased by 150,000 tons year - on - year to 1.84 million tons, with a cumulative year - on - year growth rate of 9%, mainly contributed by Indonesia. The output of Chinese and other overseas regions decreased by 50,000 tons year - on - year to 380,000 tons, with a cumulative year - on - year growth rate of - 10%. The ferronickel market had a certain inventory build - up, but due to cost support, the price decline was limited [28]. - The expected new production in Indonesia is slowing down, and the incremental supply of ferronickel is limited. In 2026, the growth of Indonesian ferronickel production capacity is expected to slow down from 10% to about 5%. It is expected that the global ferronickel supply in 2026 will increase by 60,000 tons year - on - year to 2.26 million tons, with a year - on - year growth rate of about 3%. The strategy for the ferronickel - stainless - steel line is to try long positions when the price hits the bottom, but avoid over - chasing high prices without clear supply disturbances or policy guidance [31]. 3.2.3 The Contradiction in Indonesian Nickel Mines has High Uncertainty - The contradiction at the mining end and the inventory build - up at the smelting end are in a game, and Indonesian policies still have high uncertainty. The pricing of Indonesian pyrometallurgical nickel mines has adopted a "base price + premium" model since 2023. The decline in LME nickel prices has led to a decrease in the base price, but the premium has increased, offsetting the risk of squeezed profits. The total price of Indonesian pyrometallurgical nickel mines increased slightly, which may lead to a 5% increase in the full - cost center of ferronickel produced by Indonesian self - supplied power plants to about $11,000/metal ton [40]. - From the perspective of policy expectations, Indonesia may take appropriate measures to prevent resource over - supply, such as changing the quota approval from three - year to one - year in 2026. However, Indonesia may not want a sharp increase in nickel prices and may prefer to control quotas to prevent over - supply and moderately boost prices [41]. - The cost of Indonesian hydrometallurgical production is rising steadily, and the high cobalt price supports the economic viability of nickel. The price of hydrometallurgical ore is rising moderately, and the increase in the price of auxiliary sulfur has pushed up the MHP cost. However, the increase in the by - product cobalt price can offset part of the cost, so the negative impact on MHP production economics is limited [51]. 3.3 Demand Contradictions may not be Prominent, and Long - Term Potential Lies in Ternary Materials 3.3.1 The Short - Term Growth of Ternary Material Demand is Moderate, and More Long - Term Potential is Expected - The positive and negative impacts of the increase in electric vehicle penetration rate and the decline in the structural proportion of ternary batteries offset each other, resulting in a weak growth pattern for ternary materials. In 2025, the global electric vehicle demand increased by over 20%, while the global ternary battery output increased by only over 10% year - on - year, and the inventory pressure in the industrial chain decreased [53]. - In 2026, the "positive total" and "negative structure" drivers of new - energy demand for nickel will both weaken, but still offset each other to some extent. The global electric vehicle demand growth rate may decline, and the ternary market share may still face pressure. However, the negative impact of inventory reduction on upstream demand is weakening, and the elasticity of demand during seasonal peak replenishment is increasing [53]. - Future potential depends on emerging demands such as solid - state batteries, robots, and low - altitude economy. 2027 may be an important turning point for demand. If the investment in solid - state batteries meets expectations, the ternary material demand may still grow weakly in 2026 but may turn around in 2027 [54]. 3.3.2 The Incremental Demand for Alloys is Limited, and the Raw - Material Structure is Changing - The growth rate of alloy demand is expected to be limited, and attention should be paid to the marginal changes in high - temperature and corrosion - resistant alloys. The overall growth rate of alloy demand has been declining year by year. The demand for corrosion - resistant alloys is under pressure due to factors such as the slowdown in the expansion of LNG receiving stations and the decline in LNG shipping orders. The demand for high - temperature alloys is more resilient, but the orders may be concentrated in leading enterprises [69]. - The price difference between ferronickel and refined nickel may converge in the long run. Some alloy special - steel enterprises may adjust their raw - material structure by using more ferronickel to replace refined nickel, which may intensify the supply - demand mismatch of refined nickel and also provides a new perspective on whether the conversion of ferronickel to ferronickel will be phased out in the long run [70][71]. 3.3.3 The Demand Elasticity of Stainless Steel is Low, and the Supply Rhythm Affects Nickel Consumption - The demand for stainless steel is growing weakly. The demand elasticity is low, and it is difficult to have unexpected performance. From 2020 - 2025, the year - on - year growth rate of apparent demand decreased marginally, mainly affected by factors such as the slowdown in terminal manufacturing investment, the drag of the real - estate post - cycle sector, and overseas trade barriers [89]. - The stainless - steel market has shifted from strong supply and weak demand to weak supply and demand, and the bottom - grinding market may be repeated. In 2025, the stainless - steel market was in a "bottom - seeking" process, and the supply growth rate decreased from over 8% to 3.2%. In 2026, if the stainless - steel market remains undervalued, the excess pressure is unlikely to increase. The strategy for stainless steel in 2026 is to try long positions at low prices, and the upward potential depends on external policy drivers [94][95]. 3.4 Supply - Demand Balance and Outlook 3.4.1 Supply - Demand Balance Sheet - From a static balance perspective, in 2026, the surplus contradiction in the nickel smelting end still exists. The supply side may increase by 80,000 tons year - on - year to 3.86 million tons, and the demand side may increase by 80,000 tons year - on - year to 3.63 million tons, with a surplus of 240,000 tons. The increase in low - cost supply may lower the clearing line for nickel prices, but the upward potential also depends on Indonesian mining - end policies [101]. - Dynamically, there are uncertainties about whether the inventory build - up in 2026 will be as expected, including the impact of Indonesian mining - end policies, the speed of the clearing process, the impact of macro - policies, and the possibility of hidden inventory replenishment [103]. 3.4.2 Conclusion - The fundamental contradictions in the Shanghai nickel market are accumulating, with increased volatility expected in 2026. The static reference range is 95,000 - 130,000 yuan/ton. Stainless steel has shifted to a weak supply - demand pattern, with a static reference range of 12,000 - 13,200 yuan/ton [107]. - The strategies include avoiding short - selling at low prices, considering short - selling at high prices with option protection, dynamically tracking the cost of hydrometallurgical nickel for long - buying, and paying attention to the opportunity of long - stainless steel and short - nickel when the nickel - to - steel ratio is high, as well as periodic domestic - foreign positive/negative arbitrage [108]. - In 2026, the front - end smelting may enter a second peak of low - cost replacement of high - cost production. The pyrometallurgical path still has pressure but also provides a certain safety margin. The static balance is still challenged by Indonesian policies, and the long - term outlook is promising, with 2027 possibly being an important turning point [109][110].